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TAKEOVER BIDS AND TARGET SHAREHOLDER PROTECTION:
THE REGULATORY FRAMEWORK IN THE UNITED KINGDOM,
UNITED STATES AND AUSTRALIA
Razeen SAPPIDEEN *
This Article examines the phenomenon of corporate acquisitions and regulator, responses tn the
United Kingdom, the United States, and Australia. Compared to the U. K. and Australia. the U.S.
follows a no.holds-barred approach toward tender offers and target defensive actions. The current
position of these jurisdictions reflects the existing regulatory framework. The U.K. regulator) systen
seeks to maximize shareholder decision-making i.e., shareholders having the final say on a bid.
Furthermore, the U.K. systen requires aty offer to be for all of the targets' outstanding shares nless
express approval of the regulator9 body has been obtained. The U.S. response ainis at ensuring an
equal balance of power between the offeror and target. The Austrahan Code seeks to regulate all
acquisitions in excess of tweni " percent of targets' shareholding as a means of ensuring equal
treatment and equal opportunity amongst target shareholders. The U.K. approach is byr far the
superior, as it ensures equal treatment of all target shareholders and eliminates the need for
counterproductive target nuanagement defensive actions.
1. The Basis for Regulation
1.1. Introduction
The acquisition of corporate control through share ownership has always
presented the difficult problem of shareholder protection. The problem has
become more acute with the increased use of hostile tender offer bids to gain
control. Different jurisdictions have adopted varied approaches to the prob-
lem. This Article compares the approach adopted in the United Kingdom
(U.K.) with that of the United States (U.S.) and Australia. Both the U.S. and
Australia are useful referents. The U.S. has a securities market as sophisticated
as that of the U.K. The regulatory measures the U.S. adopted with respect to
tender offers, although subsequent in time to those of the U.K., have proved
to be the most contentious of the three jurisdictions [1]. Australia's securities
• Razeen Sappideen, LL.B (Ceylon), LL.M (Sydney), LL.M (Pennsylvania), LL.M (Columbia),
Barrister-at-Law New South Wales. is a Senior Lecturer in Law at Macquarie University Law
School, Australia.
Valuable editorial assistance by Ms. Valerie H. Ruttcnberg is gratefully acknowledged.
0167-9333/86/S3.50 ©' 1986, Elsevier Science Publishers B.V. (North-Holland)
Published by Penn Law: Legal Scholarship Repository, 2014
R. Sappideen / Takeover bids and target shareholderprotection
markets are relatively young and dynamic. That nation's regulation of tender
offers, which also preceded U.S. regulation, has been climaxed by a 1981
revision of its law [2] enacted after intensive study of the U.S. and U.K.
experiences. Australian corporations law is in large measure a replica of U.K.
corporations law.
1.2. The Background
A tender offer is an invitation for target shareholders to tender their shares
on the terms offered and within the time period laid down by the offeror [3].
Offerors view the tender offer as providing a cheap and efficient form of
acquiring corporate control. The tender offeror aims to deal directly with
target shareholders to the exclusion of target management. Speed of action is
essential to the success of a tender offer.
The announcement of a tender offer is good news for target shareholders, as
the offer price will be set in excess of the prevailing market price. Where rival
offerors and arbitrageurs enter the scene, target share prices tend to rise still
higher. Thus, while tender offers are mutually advantageous to both offeror
and target shareholders, competition for target shares confers increased be-
nefits on target shareholders at the expense of the offeror.
Offeror strategy to prevent competition for target shares has consisted of
three elements: (1) to stampede target shareholders into accepting the offer;
(2) to hold target shareholders bound to the offer; and (3) to ensure that
offerors retain maximum leeway with respect to the offer. Offerors are able to
stampede target shareholders into acceptance by Skillful use of the partial bid
together with acceptances based on a first-come, first-served basis. Under the
partial bid only a percentage of thie shares is bid for, whereas under the
first-come, first-served method acceptances are made in the order tendered. In
effect, target shareholders are forced into a prisoner's dilemma. If they do not
tender, their fellow shareholders will; but once acceptances are tendered,
target shareholders cannot accept an alternative offer by the same offeror or
another offeror. In contrast, offerors endeavor to increasingly strengthen their
position by making their offer subject to certain conditions [4] which add
uncertainties to the bid and weaken further the position of target shareholders.
Offerors also make purchases by private negotiation and discrete purchases on
the stock exchange outside the tender offer in order to launch a surprise bid.
Secrecy is the all important factor, as awareness by the marketplace and
consequent activity by target management, rival offerors, and arbitrageurs
would result in an increase in target share prices.
To target management, tender offers spell anathema as successful offers
displace target management's hold on the target company. For this reason
target management resists tender offers made without their consent by such
methods as painting the best picture of the company [5] and creating obstacles
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[6]. In the U.S., resistance has also taken the form of amendments to the
corporation's charter and by-laws. One common technique is the classified
board, where only a percentage of the directors retire each year [7] and for
whom successors are elected. Total board membership is fixed at any given
time to prevent board "packing" time. The power to summon a special
meeting is vested exclusively in the board with the proviso that no action be
taken except at the annual meeting or at a special meeting of stockholders [8].
The effect is to delay any offeror action until the annual general meeting and
to reduce the impact such a meeting could have. Alteration of these provisions
is prevented by requiring voting majorities of up to ninety-five percent
(supermajorities) [9]. However, the offeror is always allowed to negotiate
directly with target management and bypass the supermajority requirements.
Such assumption of power by target management has been variously
described as management entrenching, enhancing of self-interest, and contrary
to the principles of corporate democracy [10]. Partly as a response to such
criticism, there has been a shift in the strategies adopted. The focus now is on
the target corporation's shareholders. Target shareholders are now invited to
decide in advance whether they want to receive and evaluate tender offer bids,
or keep the company independent. A declaration by target shareholders
affirming the company's independence considerably enhances management's
authority to resist a tender offer [11].
Evidence suggests that target management intervention generally results in
an increase in the offer price and in target share prices [12]. Such intervention,
therefore, is desirable. However, where target management succeeds in driving
away all offerors, target share prices fall back to around the pre-offer price
[13]. Identifying a defense threshold that produces optimum results for target
shareholders, but which does not unduly entrench target management, is the
ideal if not achievable task of the regulatory systems.
1.3. Directors' Duties and Corporate Acquisitions
In traditional Anglo-Australian law, directors are free to engage in defen-
sive tactics because their fiduciary duties are owed to the corporate entity, not
directly to shareholders [14]. Some recent cases show a slight shift in stance
[15], but fall far short of offering any meaningful protection to target share-
holders in the face of a tender offer.
Most jurisdictions in the U.S. regard directors as also owing a fiduciary
obligation to their shareholders [16]. Such obligations require directors to be
honest and open in their dealings with the company and the shareholders and
to provide necessary and relevant information where appropriate; such obliga-
tions do not inhibit management's right to resort to defensive tactics in the
face of a takeover. On the contrary, case law in the U.S. expressly recognizes
the right of target management to adopt defensive strategies to combat tender
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offers. The exercise of such power is limited by the standards prescribed by the
Business Judgment Rule [17].
Under traditional Anglo-Australian law, an action by shareholders to
restrain management excesses must be brought under an exception to the
"proper plaintiff' rule and the "internal management" rule [18]. The source of
these two rules is the decision in Foss v. Harbottle [19]. According to the
"proper plaintiff' rule, actionable breaches of duty are enforceable only by
the company, as directors are considered owing duties only to the company.
Under the "internal management" rule a company can, by ordinary resolu-
tion, authorize any action of its directors so long as the act performed is within
the competence of the company [20]. It follows that where management
commands voting control, management is able to pursue its own objectives.
This position is more difficult to uphold where management itself holds a
controlling majority of the shares [21]. The courts may then inspect the
motives of management more closely. However, one significant saving grace,
remarkably absent in the U.S. [22], is that only the original shareholder body
can vote to ratify a defensive share issue made to a "white knight" [23]. The
consequence is that the allottees of the new shares are not allowed to vote on
the validity of the share issue.
Target shareholders as a body do not benefit as much as they should by the
tender offer process. The prisoner's dilemma leaves many target shareholders
with no real choice and acts to prevent competing bids by rival offerors that
would benefit all shareholders. Where only control by the offeror is sought
and the acquisition is made through private negotiations and purchases, a
mere handful of shareholders will benefit by the higher price that is offered.
Growing dissatisfaction with these features of the marketplace for corporate
control led to the introduction of regulatory measures in the U.K., Australia,
and finally in the U.S. [24]
2. The Regulatory Framework
The centerpiece of regulatory measures governing tender offers in the U.K.
is the City Code on Takeovers and Mergers (City Code) [25]. The City Code,
issued by the City Working Party [261, is administered by the Panel [27], which
came into existence in March, 1968. In March, 1978, the Panel was made an
arm of a newly created supervisory body known as the Council for the
Securities Industry (CSI) [28]. The CSI was established to improve the
effectiveness and cohesiveness of the existing self-regulatory machinery for
securities regulation [29]. The City Code lacks the force of law. Rulings are the
result of private hearings before the Panel, with or without a rehearing by the
Appeal Committee [30]. The City Code and Panel were attempts to assuage
the heavy criticism in the press and Parliament of the tactics of bidders and
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defenders in a number of prominent tender offer battles [31]. More im-
portantly, the Code and Panel were attempts to prevent legislative intervention
regulating the conduct of takeover and mergers.
The U.K. machinery regulating tender offers includes the 1985 Companies
Act, which deals with the acquisition of minority holdings [32]. This Act is
administered by the Department of Trade. Members of the Stock Exchange
and issuing houses, who handle the bulk of the dealings [33], also voluntarily
comply with the rules dealing with circulars relating to a bid made under the
Prevention of Fraud (Investments) Act, 1958 [34]. In addition, rules of the
Department of Trade require disclosure of certain information with respect to
any written offer to acquire or dispose of securities, and with respect to
takeover offers [35].
The U.S. and Australia faced the same problems in relation to the takeover
marketplace but concluded that legislation was the proper solution. In the
U.S., the Williams Act amendments to the Securities Exchange Act of 1934
[36] were enacted in 1968 following extensive Senate hearings [37]. The
Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) Chairman, during the hearings,
explained the purpose of the Williams Act [38]:
The bill is designed, first, to provide those who receive a tender offer with
information adequate to an informed decision whether or not to accept; and second
[39), to eliminate conditions surrounding the offer which discriminate unfairly
among those who may desire to tender their shares or unreasonbly restrict their
freedom of action with respect to deposited shares at a time when there is no
assurance that the tender of their shares will be accepted.
In Australia, the first formalized attempt to regulate was made in 1961.
This was followed by a comprehensive Act in 1970 [40] which has in turn been
superseded by the Companies (Acquisition of Shares) Act (CASA or Australian
Act) [41]. In Australia, as in the U.S., an administrative agency created by
statute, the National Companies and Securities Commission (NCSC), oversees
the functioning of the securities markets and regulates corporate acquisitions.
The NCSC and the SEC, the U.S. agency, however, differ greatly both in
structure and focus [42].
Regulation in the U.K. is commonly described as self-regulation, in con-
trast to indirect regulation by government bodies in Australia and the U.S [43].
Advocates of self-regulation contend that it can set standards of fairness and
reach conduct falling into the grey areas which generally escapes the scope of
any detailed direct regulation. Self-regulation also permits rulings to be
obtained promptly, in advance of and during a bid, with the speed and
informality which a court or statutory body such as the SEC cannot match.
The Panel regards itself as the authority designated to interpret the City Code,
and as such, requires its executive to be consulted and ruling obtained on
doubtful issues [44]. Proponents of self-regulation also point to shortcomings
of the SEC's direct regulation and the SEC's inability to prevent abuses [45].
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Proponents also underscore the low cost of self-regulation [46]. Such compari-
sons, however, are meaningless unless the environment which bred the differ-
ent approaches and the different functions these bodies perform is also
appreciated. In Australia, as in the U.S., state and federal powers are divided,
and corporation law is regarded as falling within the province of state
regulation [47]. The U.K., by contrast, is spared this aspect of federalism. Even
more significant and absent from the U.S. and Australia, the idea of "self-reg-
ulation" in the U.K. was self-motivated and received as part of the industry's
culture. The Stock Exchange in London voluntarily regulated abusive practices
and thereby minimized the need for statutory regulation. This result is partly
due to the geography of the market, as the jurisdiction of the City Code and
Panel are centered around the trading markets in London. Additionally, over
the years a closely knit financial community has emerged in London. Thus,
except for an odd instance [48], the Panel has successfully excercised influence
over the financial community even though it lacks investigatory and en-
forcement powers and relies almost exclusively on professional censure [49].
U.K. self-regulation has resulted in a remarkable absence of litigation and
case law, a notable contrast with the U.S. In Australia, CASA has not
generated much case law because it is relatively new. In the past, Australian
courts have tended to be very restrictive in their interpretation of statutory
language [50]. What constitutes a "tender offer" and a "defensive share issue"
by offeree managements - two fruitful sources of litigation in the U.S. - do
not present legal issues under the Australian Act [51], which helps reduce the
amount of litigation in this area.
3. The Scheme of Regulation
Though they differ in their overall objectives, all three jurisdictions adopt a
common regulatory approach. They provide for the auction of target shares,
equal opportunity to sell, and equal treatment of all target shareholders
accepting the bid. To enable target shareholders to accept the best offer, the
Codes of each jurisdiction require the offeror and target company to provide
specified information to each other and to target shareholders. The Codes also
require the offer(s) to be kept open for a prescribed length of time to enable
the offeror and target company to respond to each other's information
dissemination and to enable target shareholders to decide in the light of such
information. More importantly, all three Codes require notification of acquisi-
tions and changes in a company's substantial shareholding. The aim is to
provide an early warning signal and to alert the marketplace of actual and
potential changes in a company's control structure. These disclosure require-
ments are of particular importance as they may apply much earlier in time
than do the tender offer Codes.
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3.1. Disclosure of Substantial Interests
All three jurisdictions require notification of changes in substantial share-
holdings with a view to regulating creeping acquisitions, "dawn raids" [52],
and "warehousing" [53]. Such notification is intended to alert the marketplace
to potential shifts in corporate control and to let market forces take effect
thereafter. This is considered desirable because it: helps to maintain the
balance between the management and the offeror; indicates to the investing
public the likelihood of any distortion from special buying or selling; indicates
to the shareholders a likely increase in the price of their shares; and reveals the
identify of substantial shareholders [54].
The strategy of the Acts in each jurisdiction is to require continuous
disclosure of acquisitions made beyond a minimum threshold and of further
acquisitions, transfers, and disposals of shares through nominees and associ-
ates. The threshold in the U.K. and the U.S. is five percent [55], and in
Australia ten percent [56]. Disclosure in the U.K. [57] and Australia [58] is
made to the company and in the U.S. to the SEC [59]. There is considerable
divergence in the details required to be disclosed, although the frameworks are
essentially the same [60].
In the U.S. the obligation to disclose is imposed on the "person" acquiring
the beneficial ownership [61]. Where the acquirer is a corporation, disclosure is
required by each officer director, and controlling person. Where the acquisi-
tion is made by a "group", disclosure is required by each member and by each
"person" controlling such member [62]. "Person" is defined to include two or
more persons acting "as a partnership, limited partnership, syndicate or other
group for the purpose of acquiring, holding or disposing of securities of an
issuer" [63]. In GAF Corp. v. Milstein [64] the court held that an agreement by
a group of security holders to act in concert, without more, was sufficient to
require the filing of a disclosure statement [65]. The court observed [661:
The history and language of section 13(d) make it clear that the statute was
primarily concerned with disclosure of potential changes in control resulting from
new aggregations of stockholdings and was not intended to be restricted to only
individual stockholders who made future purchases and whose actions were restricted
to only individual stockholders who made future purchases and whose actions were,
therefore, more apparent.... It can hardly be questioned that a group holding
sufficient shares can effect a takeover without purchasing a single additional share
of stock [671.
The Australian Act uses the phrase "associated person" [68]. The phrase is
extensively defined to include related corporations and persons, and corpora-
tions accustomed to act in accordance with the instructions of the first
corporation, their directors, and secretary. The section also applies to persons
proposing to enter into arrangements, understandings, or undertakings, whether
formal or informal, express or implied, and to persons proposing to become
Published by Penn Law: Legal Scholarship Repository, 2014
R. Sappideen / Takeover bids and larger shareholder protection
associated formally or informally [69]. Thus, the Australian and similar U.K.
provisions go further than the U.S. position stated in Milstein [70].
The required information must be furnished in the U.S. within ten days
[71], in Australia within two days [72], and in the U.K. within five business
days of the acquisition [73]. So long as the purchases do not constitute a
tender offer in the U.S., or exceed the prescribed limits in Australia (twenty
percent) and the U.K. (thirty percent), they fall outside the regulatory ambit of
the tender offer provisions.
The U.K. Act contains a unique provision which empowers the company to
seek information about share ownership from any person the company has
reason to believe is interested in its shares, or has been interested in its shares
during the past three years [74]. By this means the company is given full power
to seek for itself the information which the shareholders should have provided
the company under the provisions discussed earlier [75]. These backup mea-
sures empowering companies to seek information are broader than those
provisions requiring holders of interests to make initial disclosure to the
company. Furthermore, members holding at least ten percent of the paid-up
share capital can request that the company conduct such an enquiry. This
provision is intended to protect the company's larger interests against persons
in control [76].
3.2. Definition of a Tender Offer
The Acts use different terminology. The City Code refers to "offer," the
Williams Act to "tender offer," and the Australian Act to "takeover scheme"
and "takeover announcement." The definition of what constitutes a tender
offer is linked inextricably to two fundamental issues: (1) the operational
threshold, and (2) the scope or sweep of the Act. The former has a significant
bearing on the effectiveness of the latter, a point which is elaborated below.
An offer is treated in the City Code as including:
... wherever appropriate, takeover and merger transactions howsoever effected.
including reverse take-overs, partial offers and also offers by a parent company for
shares in its subsidiary, but offers for non-voting non-equity capital do not come
within the Code [77].
The definition of a "takeover scheme" (scheme) under the Australian Act
resembles the ordinary takeover offer except that the offer must be addressed,
in the manner prescribed, to all shareholders. A "takeover announcement"
(announcement) is a special procedure whereby the offeror announces to the
stock exchange a willingness to accept all shares tendered pursuant to the
announcement at the announced price for one month from the announcement
date. More significant than the definitions is the approach of the Australian
legislation. It provides that acquisitions which result in a person holding
twenty percent or more of the offeree's shares, or which add to a twenty
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percent holding [78], must be made by takeover offer under a scheme or an
announcement. Imposition of this absolute obligation eliminates questions of
interpretation as to what constitutes a tender offer.
Unlike the U.K. and Australian Acts, the U.S. Act neither defines tender
offer, nor prescribes a threshold point for its operation. In theory, the U.S. Act
could apply to any acquisition which falls within what is generally regarded as
a tender offer under U.S. practice. But since privately negotiated or open
market acquisitions are not regarded as tender offers, the actual operational
threshold of the U.S. Act tends to be higher. The exclusion of these acquisi-
tions is justified on the ground that they impose no pressure on tendering
target shareholders. By comparison, the U.K. adopts an operational threshold
of thirty percent, and Australia twenty percent.
The absence of a definition of tender offer in the U.S. Code has caused a
great deal of uncertainty. The SEC has over a period of time released several
draft proposals for discussion [79]. The SEC has also urged the courts to apply
guidelines adopted by it to determine the existence of a tender offer [80].
These guidelines have their origins in litigated cases and focus primarily on
acquisitions by privately negotiated transactions [81] and on the stock
exchanges [82]. Case law reflects some inconsistency [83] though the courts
have generally been reluctant to treat negotiated acquisitions as tender offers.
The SEC's guidelines do not seem to have eased the difficulty as judges in the
different jurisdictions have differed on the question [8] and manner [85] of
their applicability.
Determining the appropriate operational threshold point is of crucial
importance because of its effects on the whole tender offer process. Because
the effect of the threshold point is to free acquisitions from the demands of the
regulatory requirements, a threshold permits and encourages privately negoti-
ated bids up to that particular level. Thus, the higher the threshold point, the
greater it benefits substantial shareholders who conclude private sales. Higher
thresholds also enable greater use of partial bids. At first glance, therefore, a
twenty percent threshold, as under the Australian Act, would seem preferable
to the thirty percent required under the City Code. But this ignores the
different strategies behind the Acts. The City Code generally compels the
offeror to bid for the remaining shareholders of target once the threshold point
is passed. The City Code attempts to entice offerors into acquiring just less
than statutory control, mainly by way of private negotiations, and then forces
offerors to convert their holdings to statutory control or to sell out. On the
other hand, the strategy also forces offerors to think carefully before acquiring
a strategic position in a target corporation. Unlike the City Code, the Australian
Act has no such strategy and simply becomes operational at an earlier stage.
The U.S. Act is similar to the Australian Act in that they both miss the crucial
thrusts of the City Code - enticement and compulsion. A low threshold level,
while achieving fairness at an earlier stage, may fail to achieve any worthwhile
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result where the overall legislation permits partial bids. More important than
the actual threshold level, therefore, is the requirement that a bid be made for
all of the target's shares once the threshold point is reached.
3.3. The Mechanics of an Offer
3.3.1. Adequate Information
All three jurisdictions require target company information in response to
the opening statement by the offeror. The City Code requires issuance of an
advisory document by the board of the offeree company in response to the
offer document [86]. The Australian Act requires an offeree's reply to the
offeror's statement in either a takeover scheme or a takeover announcement
[87]. The offeror's statement and one of the offers must be registered with the
NCSC within twenty-one days before service on the offeree company [88]. The
U.S. follows a similar pattern. The offeror, in addition to filing a Schedule
13D disclosure statement, must file an even more detailed Schedule 14D-1
statement [89]. Within ten business days of announcement of the offer, the
target company is required to publish or send a statement indicating accep-
tance, rejection, a neutral stand, or its inability to take a position on the offer.
The company must state the reasons for its position [90]. In addition, notice
must be given to the offeror of any defensive strategies undertaken by the
target company management [91].
The statements required by the offeror and offeree in all three jurisdictions
provide for substantially the same coverage. The offeror statement basically
requires the offeror to provide information about itself, its officers, its finan-
cial sources, and the extent of its holdings in the offeree company. The offeree
company statement requires target management to disclose their sharehold-
ings, any compensation they may receive as a result of the offer, a statement of
target management's position with respect to the offer, and whether manage-
ment intends to accept or reject the offer with respect to their own holdings.
They must also disclose their position with respect to the offer [92]. The
statements may also include sales prices of the stock [93]; where it is sold on
the exchange, the purpose of the tender offer [94]; the offeror's intentions with
regard to the continued employment of the employees of the offeree company
[95); and profit forecasts [96].
3.3.2. Adequate Time
The City Code requires an offer to be open for at least twenty-one days
after it is posted, and at least fourteen days after the posting of a revision. The
offer should be open to all shareholders and communicated to the board of the
offeree company before shareholders are informed [97]. The board of the
offeree company is required to obtain "competent independent advice" on the
offer and to make known the substance of such advice to its shareholders [98].
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The City Code stresses both the need to keep the whole negotiating process
secret before shareholders are informed [99] and the need to keep shareholders
informed once an offer is firm. This obligation to inform is imposed no less on
the offeror than on the offeree company. Joint statements are desirable
wherever possible, provided that agreement on a statement does not lead to
undue delay [100].
The U.S. Act requires an offer to be left open for a minimum of twenty
business days [101] after it is first published or sent to security holders [102].
The Australian Act requires a takeover offer served on a target company,
unless withdrawn, to be left open for a period of between one to six months
"after the date that the offer bears" [103]. The offer must be left open to all
shareholders [104], and must provide for consideration to be paid within thirty
days of the offer [105]. The U.S. Act requires registration of its offer document
on the same day that it is served on the offeree company, to safeguard against
the possibility of leakage of information between the time of registration and
actual dispatch of the offer [106]. The Australian compromise is to make
optional the inclusion of the name and address of the offeree, the date that the
offer will bear, and details of the offeror's holdings in the offeree company
[107]. There is no provision under the U.S. or Australian Acts for joint
statements. The offeree in these countries is required to make a formal,
structured response to an offer document [108].
As observed earlier, acquisitions under the Australian Act are also possible
by way of a "takeover announcement" [109]. This arrangement permits the
offeror to announce to the target's home exchange that it will purchase during
one month all shares tendered at or above the specified "minimum price"
[110]. The takeover announcement resembles, to some extent, the practice
known as a "special bid" in the U.S. The special bid is described as "a device
... whereby a fixed price bid is made by one or more members or member
organizations for the purchase of a block of a listed security through the
facilities of a national securities exchange" [111]. The SEC has declared that a
special bid will ordinarily "constitute a 'tender offer' or 'request or invitation
for offer' within the meaning of Sections 14(d) and (e) of the Act" [112]. The
special bid differs from a takeover announcement in that the latter requires the
offeror to buy all shares offered to him in accordance with the announcement;
the offeror cannot simply buy a block unless the block represents less than
twenty percent of the shares [113].
3.3.3. Equal Treatment and Equal Opportunity
3.3.3.1. Equal Treatment. Equal treatment, strictly interpreted, requires: that
shareholders received the same price for each share tendered; that subsequent
acceptors receive the same terms; and that any subsequent increase in price be
made available to those shareholders who accepted the offer earlier. The City
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Code and the Australian Act respond affirmatively to all three of these
requirements, while the U.S. legislation achieves these same results in an
indirect manner. Thus, the City Code requires that "all shareholders of the
same class of an offeree company shall be treated similarly by an offeror"
[114]. This has been described as "the core of the code" [115]. Except with the
consent of the Panel, the offeror may not deal in shares of the offeree
company, either during an offer or when one is reasonably in contemplation, if
there are favorable conditions attached which are not being extended to all
shareholders [116]. The Panel apparently frowns on offers of higher prices
even if the offeror expresses willingness to offer the same price to subsequent
acceptances [117]. Additionally, where an offer is revised, all shareholders who
accepted the original offer must receive the revised consideration [118].
The Australian Act requires that the same price be offered for all shares
pursuant to the takeover offer or takeover announcement, though in some
instances differential offers are allowed. Regarding takeover offers, differential
offers "attributable only to the fact that the offers relate to shares having
different accrued divided entitlements or relate to shares on which different
amounts are paid up" are permitted [119]. With respect to takeover announce-
ments, the on-market offeror can, with the approval of the NCSC, reduce his
offer where: the offeree company makes an allotment of, or grants an option
to subscribe for any of its shares; the offeree company issues, or agrees to
issue convertible notes; or the target company declares a dividend [120].
Furthermore, under a takeover announcement, unlike the case of a takeover
offer [121], subsequent increased offers are not required to be made available
to earlier acceptors [122].
The U.S. legislation contains no specific provision requiring that the same
price be paid to all shareholders under the initial offer. The only restriction
requires that any increase in price offered during a tender offer be given to
earlier acceptors [123]. In Unocal Corp. v. Mesa Petroleum Co. [124], the
Delaware Supreme Court, on appeal, refused to enjoin a selective repurchase
by a target corporation of its own shares in exchange for debt securities. The
exchange offer was not open to the offeror corporation.
Following this case, the SEC released two proposals. The first proposal -
later withdrawn - would have required that a third party tender offer to be
open to all holders of the class of securities subject to the tender offer ("all
holders" rule), and that all security holders must be paid the highest considera-
tion offered to any security holder [125]. The proposal would have brought the
U.S. into conformity with the U.K. and Australian practice. The second
proposal seeks to amend present Rule 13e-4 to bring the provisions governing
issuer tender offers into conformity with those governing third party tender
offers [126]. The second also seeks to eliminate the advantages afforded
defensive issuer tender offers [127].
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3.3.3.2. Equal Opportunity. Full disclosure and a guarantee of equal treatment
are in themselves inadequate to ensure fairness where the offer does not allow
all shareholders to tender their shares. This is particularly true under a partial
bid, where an immediate response is essential. In an atterfipt to minimize
unfairness among shareholders in such bids, the U.S. Act [128] and the
Australian Act [129] require the offeror to prorate the acquisitions. The City
Code goes much further and calls for prior approval of a partial bid by the
Panel [130]. The latter requirement, though it may appear restrictive, reflects a
significant departure from earlier versions of the City Code which prohibited
partial bids altogether. The City Code views partial bids as undesirable on the
ground that effective control of the company is a matter for decision by all
shareholders [1311.
The Australian Act [1321 and the U.K. Companies Act of 1948 [133] also
provide for compulsory acquisition of minority shareholdings remaining after
a takeover. Acquisition of the minority shareholdings is required when the
offeror becomes entitled to ninety percent of the shares in the company, and
in certain circumstances when the offeror is already a shareholder of the
company [134]. The requirement is enforceable at the request of either the
offeror or the offeree shareholder [135]. In the U.S. neither the state acts nor
the federal legislation provide for the compulsory acquisition of such minority
interests.
3.3.3.3. The Right to Withdraw Acceptance of an Offer. The right to withdraw
acceptance during a takeover offer enables the shareholder to accept the best
offer among rival bidders. The aim is not to let the shareholder escape his
contractual obligations but to prevent him from being locked into an unfair
bargain. The problem arises when the offer is conditional upon minimum
acceptance or upon clearance by a regulatory authority, or where the offeror
extends the duration of his offer. In each of these circumstances, the offeree
shareholder, through no fault of his own, is deprived of the opportunity to
accept an alternative offer unless given the right to withdraw an earlier
acceptance.
For this reason, the City Code requires an offer to be initially left open for
twenty-one days [136]. A shareholder can withdraw his acceptance at any time
after the expiration of a twenty-on day period until the offer becomes or is
declared unconditional [137]. An offer may be extended beyond this period
with the permission of the Panel, which will normally only be granted if no
competing offer has been announced [138]. Furthermore, an offer cannot be
declared unconditional unless holders of at least fifty percent of the outstand-
ing stock accept it.
In the U.S., the offeree is given withdrawal rights until fifteen business days
after the date of commencement of the tender offer [139]. Withdrawal rights
are also available for up to ten business days after commencement of a
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competing offer by a rival bidder, provided that the original offeror is given
notice of such offer and the withdrawal is limited to securities which have not
been accepted for payment by the original tender offeror [140].
In the U.S. and in Australia, the offeror can make the offer contingent on a
minimum level of acceptance. The U.K. provision is restricted on the theory
that an offer failing to attract a fifty percent level of acceptance has been
pitched at too low a price [141]. The Australian and the U.S. Acts thus permit
total ownership of the offeree company at bargain prices that do not ade-
quately compensate the offeree's shareholders, by the skillful use of a two-or
three-tiered offer. Also, the Australian Act, unlike the U.K. and U.S. Acts,
grants the offeror unrestricted power to withdraw his offer for shares that have
not yet been tendered, after the first fourteen days following an offer 1142].
This undesirable feature has the effect of forcing target shareholders to tender
all their shares, as does the provision for partial bids.
4. Transactions Outside the Tender Offer
4.1. Purchases on the Stock Exchange during a Tender Offer
The question of whether a tender offeror should be allowed to buy shares
on the stock exchange while a tender offer is in progress is very closely linked
with the question of equal treatment of all shareholders. Accepting share-
holders who are unable to withdraw their acceptances are locked into the
tender offer. Most importantly, allowing the tender offeror to buy shares
outside the tender offer would prejudice the rights of persons accepting under
a partial offer and whose acceptances are subject to the proration requirement.
The problem can be approached in several different ways. One way is to
prohibit all acquisitions outside the tender offer. A second is to permit the
shareholder to rescind the prior acceptance of the tender offer. A third is to
require the offeror to make available to accepting shareholders the same price
offered to others. A mixed approach has been adopted by each of the three
jurisdictions.
The existence of the high minimum threshold levels of thirty percent in the
U.K. and twenty percent in Australia permit unrestricted purchases on the
exchange up to these levels. Subsequent acquisitions which do not increase the
extent of ownership by more than two percent during a twelve month period
in the U.K. [143] or three percent over a six month period in Australia [144]
are allowed without meeting the requirements for tender offers. U.S. law also
permits acquisitions of up to two percent during a twelve month period where
a tender offer has been announced [145].
The City Code and the Australian Act permit the offeror to acquire shares
on the exchange during a tender offer but require the offeror to make available
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the same higher price or additional benefits to all accepting shareholders [146].
There are two main advantages in this approach. First, it permits the offeror to
continue trading on the exchange; second, and perhaps more importantly, it
does not disadvantage the offeror as against other persons acquiring shares on
the exchange during the tender offer. The Australian Act and the City Code
impose certain other limitation on the purchase of shares outside the tender
offer [147] to protect shareholders who may wish to accept the increased offer
during the final days, but are unable to do so because of geographical and
other limitations. Concomitantly, both laws also seek to ensure that the offeror
does not withdraw his formal tender offer as a result of the acquisitions on the
stock exchange [1481. The offeror is required to keep the home exchange of the
offeree company informed on a daily basis of dealings in shares of the offeree
company [149]. The Australian Act also requires persons holding a minimum
of five percent of the offeree companys shares during this period to update
information concerning variations in their holdings [150]. Finally, in Australia,
the offeror and the on-market offeror are prohibited from selling their shares
during the period of the offer, except in the face of a counterbid by a person
not associated with the offeror [151].
Both the City Code and the U.S. Act differ from the Australian Act in one
major respect. They do not permit acquisitions on the exchange of shares in
the offeree company during the period of a partial bid. This removes the
possibility of any unfair consequences that may result from the application of
the proration requirements.
As stated earlier, U.S. law also provides for a safe harbor acquisition,
which, like the U.K., is limited to two percent over a twelve month period
[152]. Unlike the other two jurisdictions, however, the U.S. Act prohibits
acquisitions outside the tender offer (either on the exchange or by private
negotiation) during the period of the tender offer [153].
4.2. Pre- and Post-Tender Offer Acquisitions
Another question is whether acquisitions made immediately prior to, or
following a tender offer should be regarded as part of the tender offer itself. In
the U.S. the treatment of pre-tender acquisitions as part of the tender offer, it
is argued, will result in all stockholders being treated equally as required by
Rule 10b-13 [154] and the Williams Act [155], and prevent the offeror from
enjoying a free ride at the expense of the offeree shareholders on the initial
accumulations. But so far the courts have rejected this contention. In Gulf and
Western Indus. v. Great Atlantic and Pacific Tea Co. [156], the offeror had
acquired approximately 4.1 percent of the shareholdings by on-market
purchases prior to making a tender offer. The offeree company, in alleging a
violation of the Williams Act, argued that the offeror had failed to give the
sellers in the marketplace the information disclosed to the tender offerees even
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though both groups were faced with basically the same decision. The court,
however, noted: "the 5 percent limit included in section 14(d) permits that
amount to be purchased in the open market without regard to any subsequent
tender offer" [157].
Where more favorable terms are offered on the initial accumulations than is
subsequently offered under the tender offer, it may be argued that no injustice
results because it is always open to the offerees to reject the offer and force a
higher offer. Such a choice is often illusory, however, at least with respect to
non-controlling shareholders. Thus, in Sunshine Mining Co. v. Great Western
United Co. [1581, the defendant, after having disclosed to the New York Stock
Exchange that it planned to make a tender offer on the next business day,
proceeded to acquire by private arrangement at a higher price nearly six
percent of the offeree's stock. The court's finding that the negotiated purchases
were separate and independent from the proposed tender offer avoided the
issue of aggregation.
Arguably the offeror should not be allowed to take advantage of the slump
in prices in the after math of a tender offer to acquire more stock. This slump
is caused mainly by the stabilization of the marketplace and by the sale of
arbitrageurs' stock that has not been accepted in the tender offer. In addition,
unlike a pre-tender offer where the offeror may not possess any special
knowledge - except his intent to request tender - in post-tender offers the
offeror may act as a corporate insider. To reduce exploitation of any special
insider advantages, the SEC has proposed a rule requiring a cooling-off period
to preclude the offeror from capitalizing on any "unsettling market condition"
caused by the tender offer [159].
The proposed SEC rule does not consider pre-tender offers, primarily
because they are inextricably linked with the question of intent. A way to
overcome this difficulty would be to impute the necessary intent to make a
tender offer if a tender offer is in fact made during the three month period
following the last acquisition under the five percent threshold. Three months is
sufficiently close to the earlier acquisitions to give it the character of a unified
transaction leading to the tender offer.
4.3. The Impact of Risk Arbitrageurs
Offeree shareholders in a tender offer can often find a market for their
shares by selling to securities professionals known as risk arbitrageurs. The
arbitrageurs buy shares in the market when a tender offer is announced with a
view to reselling them to the offeror in a cash tender offer, or exchanging them
for the offeror's shares or notes in an exchange tender offer. In the exchange
tender offer, the arbitrageur will, in addition to buying target shares, sell short
an equivalent amount of the offeror's notes or stock [160]. This short position
will be covered by the offeror's securities which the arbitrageur will receive in
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exchange for target shares. In each of these transactions, the arbitrageur
expects to realize a gain on the difference between the acquisition cost and the
proceeds of the transaction [161].
Arbitrageurs determine whether to take a risk position and, if so, how much
to pay by taking into account such factors as book value, earnings, and
liquidation value. In an exchange tender offer, there is the additional risk that
the offeror's securities may not hold their value after consummation of the
offer. Where the arbitrageur views the tender offer as being risk-free, he may
offer a price almost equivalent to the tender offer price [162].
Arbitraging confers several benefits on the shareholders. It permits an
immediate sale at a price close to the tender offer price regardless of whether
the tender offer is ever consummated. It also helps avoid the proration
requirements. The shareholder, in return, foregoes the possibility of receiving a
higher price from the tender offer or a rival tender offer, or from a rise in
market prices when several arbitrageurs are engaged in acquiring shares in the
same corporation [1631.
Arbitrageurs appear to play a more active role in the U.S. than in the U.K.
[164] for two main reasons. First, as noted earlier, is the absence of a
definition of tender offer in the U.S. Code. Under existing guidelines [165],
arbitraging does not amount to a tender offer. Second, and more importantly,
target defensive tactics in the U.S. are much more intense, costly, and
time-consuming. The uncertainty such actions generate as to the outcome of a
tender offer permits greater arbitrage activity, although it must be queried
whether the use of "shark repellent," "scorched earth," and "poison pill"
defensive actions in recent times is conducive to arbitraging at all [166].
The obvious question is whether the price paid to arbitrageurs exceeds the
benefits they confer. First, arbitrageurs set their own limits as to price and
quantity. This negates the important safeguards of equal treatment and equal
opportunity provided under the tender offer regulatory codes. Secondly,
arbitrageurs are not required to provide any information about their activity,
save that required under the provisions governing the acquisition of substan-
tial shareholdings [1671. Finally, arbitraging adds to the pressure placed on
shareholders through a tender offer by claims, counterclaims, and competing
bids. Rather than await the best price, target shareholders are swayed to
accept the arbitrageur's offer. In summary, even though tender offer rules
promote competition and require Tender offerors to provide information,
arbitrageurs operate outsider those rules. The arbitrageurs profit by the
tensions they have helped create.
There are other more compelling reasons why tender offer arbitrage may
require close examination. The arbitrageur is not an investor as such [168], and
has no interest in the welfare of either the target company or the offeror [169].
The very nature of arbitraging requires the arbitrageur to ultimately ensure the
success of an offer. Such action clearly tilts the balance in favor of the offeror,
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a consequence intentionally avoided by the regulatory Codes. Also, to the
extent that arbitraging favors the offeror [170], it may facilitate acquisitions
that are not productive. The problem is magnitified in a jurisdiction such as
the U.S. where negotiated acquisitions fall outside the definition of a tender
offer [171]. Arbitraging enable larger shareholders to get a higher price than
they would under the terms of a tender offer. Arbitrageurs, too, can negotiate
to receive this higher price outside the tender offer. These two factors - initial
purchase by arbitrageurs from pressured shareholders and the subsequent sale
through private negotiations - are not consistent with the general purposes of
the regulatory Codes.
5. The Problem of Partial Bids
There are significant differences in the U.K., U.S., and Australian ap-
proaches to the treatment of partial bids and target defensive actions. The
U.K. Approach to these two issues explains to a large extent the success of its
system of self-regulation.
Partial bids are permitted under the U.S. and Australian Acts. The City
Code permits partial bids only if Panel consent has been obtained. The City
Code differentiates between partial bids where the acquisition will result in a
holding of less than thirty percent, between thirty and forty percent, and in
excess of fifty percent. Generally, all partial bids must seek statutory control
(holdings in excess of fifty percent) and must carry the warning that if the
offer succeeds, the offeror can exercise actual voting control and acquire
further shares without incurring any obligation to make a Rule 9 bid [172].
Partal bids, by their nature, place target shareholders in an unconfortable
position both during and after the bid. Proration avoids one aspect of
unfairness flowing from partial bids because it prevents acquisition from only
selected persons. But proration results in another problem as target share-
holders are forced to compete among themselves [173]. Target shareholders are
subjected to the prisoner's dilemma [174], as are shareholders under the
unregulated tender offer. Failure to accept will result in the other share-
holders' being even better off than the rejecting shareholders [175] and in a
forced buy out by a takeout merger or a going private transaction at a much
lower price than offered under the first part of the offer. Faced with this
choice, it would be unwise for a target shareholder not to accept such a bid.
Placing shareholders in such a predicament is contrary to the objectives
contemplated by the regulatory Codes.
Several methods of remedying the target shareholders' situation have been
suggested, from a prohibition of partial bids altogether to a discretionary
approach requiring consent, as under the City Code. A proposed method
between the two extremes would impose a disincentive on partial bidders by
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requiring a longer minimum offering period for partial bids than that required
for full bids [176]. The difficulty with this intermediate position is that it may
add to market uncertainty [177]. Still, another proposed method would require
a partial bid to be made for a specified proportion of each shareholder's
holding instead of the current open partial bid. The latter recommendation
identifies correctly the effects of prorating, which are responsible for the
coercion [178]. While this last method has considerable merit, the goals of the
regulatory Codes are best achieved by prohibiting partial bids altogether.
A successful partial bid not only gives the offeror a head start, but may also
ensure the ultimate success of an offer. The successful partial bid at least
places the offeror in a very strong position compared to the bidder's rival. For
these reasons, a partial bid is often the first stage of an offeror's plan. Further
acquisitions can be made either by way of a second-tier offer or a squeeze-out
merger [179]. Partial bids adversely affect the position of target management,
which in turn results in a mutuality of interests among target management and
shareholders to thwart such an offer. This mutuality of interests has nurtured
the very interesting recent developments in target management defensive
techniques in the U.S.
6. Target Management Defensive Actions
What partial bids are to the offeror, defensive actions are to target manage-
ment. The U.K. and U.S. have adopted significantly different approaches to
these two matters, while the Australian approach falls midway between them.
U.K. practice prohibits the use of defensive tactics [180] while the U.S.
perceives a need for such defenses. The U.K. approach, which combines
restrictions on target management defensive tactics with a prohibition on
partial bids, neither hinders offerors nor forces target shareholders into a
prisoner's dilemma. The U.K. approach also prevents target management
entrenchment, which results from the use of defensive tactics.
U.S. practice recognizes target defensive actions as a necessary management
response to tender offers [181], subject to the requirements of the Business
Judgment Rule [182]. Defensive measures include self-tenders and share
repurchases, sale of assets, counter tender offers for the offeror (Pac-Man),
share allotments to white knights, shark repellents such as the "poison pill"
preferred stock, and a combination of "supermajority, .... fair price," and
"right of redemption" provision [183].
Both self-tender offers [184] and ordinary share repurchases [185] involve
the target company buying back its own shares to increase the price [186]. A
form of share repurchase is the management buy out or the leveraged buy out
[187], under which target management purchases all of its shares or assets and
goes private. The acquisition is made from borrowed funds secured by the
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assets of the target corporation. Ordinary share repurchases of this type are
not regulated so that unequal treatment of target shareholders can easily result
[188].
The sale of assets or "crown jewels" by the target is an attempt to
neutralize the offeror's underlying reason for making the offer by selling off
those assets which are most attractive to the offeror. Like all other defensive
actions, the appropriateness of this tactic is assessed in terms of the Business
Judgment Rule [189]. In Whittaker Corp. v. Edgar [190], the court expressed
the view that "a sale of substantial asset by a [target] corporation in the face
of a hostile tender offer standing alone is not a violation of section 14(3)"
[191]. The tactic, however, has not proved to be altogether successful. For
example, Liggett's sale of a subsidiary in the face of Grand Metropolitan's bid
for the Liggett Group was not sufficient to stop Grand Metropolitan from
going ahead with the bid [192]. However, Grand Metropolitan was forced to
raise its bid to prevent a white knight bid for Liggett [193].
In the Pac-Man or counter tender offer defense, the target responds by
making a tender offer for the would-be acquirer [1941. Variants of this practice
have been developed. In the Martin Marietta Corp. v. Bendix Corp. [195] bid,
each company sought to acquire control over the other through open market
purchase programs. In Jacobs v. G. Heileman Brewing Co. [196], Heileman
tendered for Pabst to defend Pabst against a hostile offer by a third party. The
object of the Pac-Man defense is to enable the target to retain its indepen-
dence by either merging into the offeror on its own terms or forcing the
offeror to back away. In cases where target companies failed to retain their
independence, target shareholders still received a much higher average price
for their shares as a result of the defense [197].
The combination of "supermajority," "fair price," and "right of redemp-
tion" provisions requires a supermajority vote of target shareholders for the
second stage of a two-tiered bid unless the transaction is approved by the
continuing directors of the target, or the offeror pays the equivalent of the
highest price paid during the first stage of the offer. Right of redemption
provisions typically entitle the shareholders of the target to require redemption
of their shares by the target where an offeror acquired at least fifty percent of
the target's shares in a tender offer opposed by target management [198].
Thus, while the fair price provisions have the effect of ensuring equal treatz
ment of accepting shareholders under the second tier of a two-tiered bid, the
right of redemption provisions deter bids which only attempt to obtain
control. The combined effect of both provisions forces the offeror to make a
one-price bid for all of the target's outstanding shares.
A more recent practice is the "poison pill" preferred stock. As utilized in
the bid for control of ASARCO Inc. by Weeks Petroleum Ltd. [199], the
strategy involves the allotment of "supercharged" bonus preference shares,
each having many times the voting power of normal shares. The supercharged
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votes come into effect only in the event of a tender offer bid and carry special
redemption and conversion privileges. The redemption privilege discourages
the making of partial tender offers by giving its holders the power to deplete
target company's assets, while the conversion privilege discourages two-tiered
tender offers by equalizing the prices of the tiers [200]. The strategy is to
effectively disenfranchise hostile offerors, who must either obtain approval
from target management or bid for all of the target's outstanding shares. In
either event the "supercharged" provisions do not apply. Legitimacy for this
approach is founded on Board approval. Despite criticism [201], the poison
pill defense, like the "supermajority", "fair price", and "right of redemption"
combination, results in equal treatment of target shareholders.
Another practice is "greenmailing," where arbitrageurs sell back to the
company, at substantial profit, shares they have acquired in it. The practice of
greenmail or selective stock repurchases emerged because U.S. law enables
corporations to buy back their own shares [202). Greenmail has the obvious
effects of depleting the target's assets, reducing its profitability, and substan-
tially increasing its debt load. Greenmail may also result in target management
entrenchment. For these reasons, the abolition of greenmail has been sug-
gested unless prior shareholder approval is obtained [203].
Target defensive actions are a necessary factor to ensure target shareholder
welfare in the U.S. context of hostile tender offers. However, the use of certain
practices such as greenmailing, creation of antitrust obstacles, sale of crown
jewels, and counter tender offers is of debatable value, as such defenses are
primarily obstructive with only incidental benefits to target shareholders. In
contrast, defensive measures such as the "poison pill" preferred stock and the
combination of "supermajority", "fair price", and "right of redemption"
provisions should be permitted as they compel offerors to bid for all of the
target's shares at the same price, ensuring equal treatment of all shareholders.
The Australian regulations prohibit golden parachutes [204], share re-
purchases [205], and issuance of poison pills [206]. Share allotments are
permissible if they are pari passu [207], or where the allotment has been
approved by shareholders at a general meeting, not including the votes
attached to allotted shares [208]. Sale of assets are regulated [209]. The
Australian Associated Stock Exchanges refuse to allow charter amendments
even though there exists no specific prohibition against the practice [210]. Not
regulated are the Pac-Man defense, antitrust obstacles, and front-end loaded
two-tier bids. Clearly this approach lacks necessary controls.
The U.K. approach currently offers the best solution. The U.S. position is
both uncertain and wasteful in terms of the resources expended on litigation,
while the Australian position is uncertain and potentially wasteful. The
strength of the U.K. approach lies not only in prohibiting defensive tactics but
also in regulating partial bids, thereby prohibiting two-tier bids. Absent a
move to adopt the U.K. approach toward all defenses, charter amendments
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and poison pills should be abolished in the U.S. along with two-tier bids and
partial bids in general.
7. Conclusion
Despite identifiable common threads, the Codes of the U.K., U.S., and
Australia differ in terms of overall philosophy and structure. The philosophy
of the U.K. City Code is to ensure that target shareholders make the final
decision between claims of offerors and incumbent target management. The
Code achieves this by requiring target management to apprise shareholders of
the merits of a tender offer, to solicit alternative bids, and to obtain consent of
the Panel on all bids for less than total control. The U.S. Act professes
neutrality as between offeror and target management, but the indicated high
level of arbitrage activity seems to have largely destroyed neutrality. The
Australian Act seeks to regulate initial and subsequent acquisitions that result
in a single holding between twenty and ninety percent of total shares. The
basic premise is that control ought not to pass without the safeguards provided
under the Australian Act, or alternatively, that it pass slowly enough for
informed decision-making [211]. As partial bids are a recognized feature under
the Australian Act, however, there is little to commend the approach in terms
of either strategy or shareholder fairness.
Jurisdiction in the U.K. is vested at the national level [212], in the U.S. at
the federal level [213], and in Australia at the state level [214]. Moves in the
U.K. to set up a statutory regulatory body have been vigorously attacked on
grounds of cost, flexibility, effectiveness, and efficiency, Voluntary bodies
under the U.K. self-regulatory system, it is argued, can and do act swiftly,
emphasize compliance beyond the letter of the la'w, provide ethical standards
of conduct and behavior, help initiate regulation, and, where necessary, enlist
the help of high-powered industry executives. Such an evolutionary approach,
it is contended, increases the likelihood of compliance with the "spirit" of the
law rather than the "letter" only. But these very claims embody drawbacks.
There is the possibility of self-serving, anti-competitive regulation, non-en-
forcement of rules, and activities and organizations developing outside the
jurisdictional power of the self-regulatory body. Informal means, non-statu-
tory methods, and part-time committees of a system based on voluntary
acceptance are unable to handle so complex a task [215]. The need for a body
possessing investigatory and enforcement powers is apparent [216]. The need,
however, is not for an SEC-type body, but rather for a body with some
SEC-type powers.
In the U.S., critics of the Williams Act point to the additional costs that
such legislation imposes. It is argued that the number of acquisitions is
reduced under the Act, with a consequent loss of the benefits of market
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regulation of corporation control. Such claims are exaggerated and are preim-
ised on the simple assumption that the greater the number of acquisitions, the
greater the benefits that will flow.
The SEC is criticized for its great costs compared to its benefits [217], its
"backward looking" image [218] and its failure to orient itself toward de-
termining future values of investors, and its mission in general [219]. The SEC
has at the same time been charged with being overzealous in prosecuting and
in demanding compliance with its requirements [220]. These criticisms, which
are directed principally at the specific actions of the SEC rather than the role
of the SEC itself, have been made with much force. They have also been
challenged and refuted with equal force [221].
These viewpoints have been taken into account by the U.K.'s proposed
Financial services Bill [222], which recommends a system of "self regulation
within a statutory framework" [223]. The Bill seeks to offer both a structural
and legislative framework for investor protection. Structurally, it recommends
the setting up of an Agency to oversee the functioning of recognized Self
Regulating Organizations (SROs) (e.g., the Stock Exchange and the City Code
Panel), recognized professional bodies (e.g., accountants and solicitors), and
other such groups. The Agency is to be vested with rule-making and admin-
istrative powers. Membership of its governing body is to include experienced
investment practitioners and user's representatives, whose appointment and
removal is to be made jointly by the Secretary of State and the Governor of
the Bank of England. The Agency is required to have satisfactory systems for
monitoring and enforcing observance of its rules and to have effective arrange-
ments for investigation of complaints. It must keep records and be able and
willing to promote and maintain high standards of integrity and of fair dealing
in the financial sector [224]. The Agency is also required to have rules relating
to the "conduct of business" which are to apply to persons who are authorized
directly by the Board to carry on investment business, and are to act as a
model set of rules for each of the SROs [225]. As a legislative framework for
investor protection, the Bill contains provisions dealing with, for example, the
Official Listing of Securities (§§ 118-131), Offers of Unlisted Securities (§§
132-141), Takeover Offers (§ 142 and Schedule 10), and Insider Dealing (§§
143-147) [226]. This framework is to be expanded upon by bodies such as the
SROs [227].
The U.S. approach differs from the U.K. and Australian approaches in
several additional respects. One difference is the view that privately negotiated
acquisitions are not part of a tender offer. This view eases the offeror's task,
although at the price of equal treatment of ordinary shareholders. Another
difference is the practice of greenmailing, where arbitrageurs and others sell
back to the target company the shares they have acquired. A third difference is
the application of the Business Judgment Rule to determine the appropriate-
ness of target management's defensive actions, while a fourth difference deals
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with the handling of partial bids. Still another difference is the treatment of
defensive share allotments to white knights. These contrasts in the regulation
of key aspects of tender offers underscore the serious deficiencies of the U.S.
and Australian approaches. The contrasts also point to a failure to address
directly important problems.
Notes
[11 L. Loss, Fundamentals of Securities Regulation 572-80 (1983).
[2] Companies (Acquisition of Shares) Act (CASA), 1981, Austl. Acts P. No. 2.
[3] Black's Law Dictionary 1316 (5th ed. 1979); see also Loss, supra note 1, at 582
(Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) position on what constitutes a tender offer).
[4] These conditions include the right: not to proceed with the bid unless a minimum
percentage was received; to proceed with the bid regardless of the percentage received: to make
subsequent bids at the original or a different price; to make differential offers; and to require
favorable time frameworks.
(5] For example, asset revaluations, increased dividend payments. and appeals to share-
holder loyalty. N. Weinberg & M. Blank, On Takeovers and Mergers 651, 2460 (4th ed. 1979).
[6] For example, purchases of its own stock, purchases of the offeror's stock, golden
parachutes, antitrust and other regulatory obstacles, and litigation with a vengeance. Id. at
2455-56.
171 See Model Business Corp. Act § 37 (rev. 1980); Smith, Fair Price and Redemption
Rights: New Dimensions in Defense Charter Provisions, 4 Del. J. Corp. L. 1, 3 (1978).
[8] Smith, supra note 7, at 5.
[91 Id.
[101 See, e.g., id. at 12; E. Aranow, H. Einhorn, & G. Bernstein, Developments in Tender
Offers for Corporate Control 195 (1977).
[111 Steinbrink, Management's Response to the Takeover Attempt, 28 Case W. Res. L. Rev.
882, 906 (1978). In return, shareholders are given the same types of rights and remedies as are
available in connection with statutory mergers, sales of substantially all of a company's assets, and
similar transactions. Fundamental changes in corporate ownership and control should not be
accomplished without broadly based shareholder approval. Charter amendments adopted pursuant
to these objectives take two forms, fair price provisions and right of redemption provisions. Both
are directed primarily at the more recent phenomenon of two-tier bids. See Smith, supra note 7,
at 13-22.
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target's shares. In the second step, the offeror acquires the remainder of the targets shares in
exchange for its own securities - the offer being less than the cash paid in the first step. See
Comment, Front-End Loaded Tender Offers: The Application of Federal and State Law to an
Innovative Corporate Acquisitions Technique, 131 U. Pa. L. Rev. 389, 389 (1982).
[12] See Dodd & Ruback, Tender Offers and Stockholder Returns: An Empirical Analysis,
1977 J. Fin. Econ. 351; Asquith, Merger Bids, UncertainO' and Stockholder Returns, 1983 3. Fin.
Econ. 51.
[13] See supra note 12.
[14] Percival v. Wright, (1902] 2 Ch. 421.
[15] See, e.g., Gething v. Kelner [1972] 1 All E.R. 1166. In Gething, a takeover case, Judge
Brightman held that directors of an offeree company have a duty towards their own shareholders,
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which includes a duty to be hones' and a duty not to mislead. Id. at 1170. His Lordship found the
offerce directors to be in breach of that duty when they permitted the offer to go out with their
expressed recommendation but without disclosure of a recommendation to the contrary by the
company's stockbrokers. Id. In Coleman v. Myers [19771 2 N.Z.L.R. 225, another takeover case.
the New Zealand Court of Appeals held that whether or not a fiduciary duty of directors to
shareholders exists depends upon "all the circumstances and nature of the responsibility which in
a real and practical sense the director has assumed towards the shareholders." Id. at 324-25.
[16] See, e.g., Mayflower Hotel Stockholders Protective Comm. v. Mayflower Hotel Corp..
173 F. 2d 416 (D.C. Cir. 1949). The directors of a corporation occupy a fiduciary relationship to
the corporation and its shareholders. Directors must act in the utmost good faith in managing
corporate affairs. Id. at 418: see also W. Cary & M. Eisenberg, Corporations. Cases and Materials
714 (unabr. 4th ed. 1981).
[17] See E. Brodsky & M. Adamski. Law of Corporate Officers and Directors: Rights.
Duties and Liabilities (1985).
[18] See Burland v. Earle. 1902 A.C. 83, 93.
[19] Foss v. Harbottle [18431 2 Hare 461 (a minority shareholder may sue to enforce a right
vested in the company only in exceptional circumstances).
[20] Until recently, the question of whether an action was ultra rares or within the powers
conferred by the Memorandum (Charter) and Articles (By-Laws) was a significant issue in
Anglo-Australian law. It is no longer of any importance. See Companies (Comp.) Act, 1985, § 35:
Australian Companies Code, 1986, §§ 67-68.
[21] See, e.g., Cook v. Decks, 1916 A.C. 554.
[22] See, e.g., Treadway Co. v. Care Corp.. 638 F. 2d 357, 384 (2d Cir. 1980) (voting of
shares issued to "white knight" permitted at shareholder meeting, even if management control is
thereby maintained).
[23] Harlowe's Nominees Pty Ltd. v. Woodside Oil Co.. 121 C.L.R. 483 (Austl. 1968): see
also Howard Smith Ltd. v. Ampol Petroleum Ltd., 1974 A.C. 821.
[24] Panel on Takeovers and Mergers, City Code on Takeovers and Mergers (1968) (in the
U.K.); Company Law Advisory Committee, Second Interim Report to the Standing Committee of
Attorneys' General on Disclosure of Substantial Shareholdings and Takeover Bids (March 14.
1970) (in Australia): Williams Act, Pub. L. No. 90-439. 82 Stat. 454 (1968) (codified as amended
at 15 U.S.C. §§ 78m(d)-(e). n(d)-(f) (1982)) (in the U.S.).
[25] Panel on Takeovers and Mergers. City Code on Takeovers and Mergers (1985) [hereinafter
cited as City Code]. The City Code consists of 10 General Principles (GPs), and 37 Rules. In
addition, there are five rules governing the substantial acquisition of shares. The GPs are a
codification of "good standards of commercial behavior" intended to have an obvious and
universal application, while the Rules are intended to be examples of the application of the GPs or
are rules of procedure to govern takeovers and mergers. As such, the Rules are to be interpreted in
the light of the GPs and the broad expression of intention in the GPs. Furthermore, the City Code
imposes the spirit as well as the precise wording of the GPs and Rules to be observed, extending
to areas and circumstances not explicitly covered by any rule. See id., at Introduction and General
Principle 1. The City Code itself has been amended and revised on several occasions, most
recently in April. 1985. Id.
[26] The City Working Party is an ad hoc group of individuals representing various sectional
interests such as the accepting houses, investment trust companies, the insurance industry, and the
Issuing Houses Association. See N. Weinberg & M. Blank. supra note 5, §§ 2701, 2707.
[27] The Panel consists of the chairmen of the various sponsoring organizations. It also
includes the President of the Institute of Chartered Accountants. a representative of the Confeder-
ation of British Industry, and a representative of the Governor of the Bank of England who is
Deputy Chairman of the Panel. The Chairman is an independent outsider. Id. §§ 2705. 2707. The
day-to-day work is delegated to a Director General, two Deputies, a Secretary, and six other
executives. Id. § 1203. From rulings on these provisions there can be a reference to the Panel and.
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from there, an appeal against disciplinary penalties to a committee presided over by a former
High Court Judge. Id. §§ 2708-2820.
[28] See N. Weinberg & M. Blank, supra note 5, § 1203.
[29] The membership of the CSI is similar to, but somewhat larger than that of the Panel. In
addition to being a coordinating body, CS's stated objectives are to supervise and maintain
ethical standards, resolve differences between, and initiate new codes of conduct in relation to the
various parts of the Securities Industry, and consider an examine proposals for new legislation.
See Gower, Review of Investor Protection, A Discussion Document 38 (HMSO London) (1982).
[30] See supra note 27.
[31] See Demott, Current Issues in Tender Offer Regulation: Lessons from the British, 58
N.Y.U.L. Rev. 945, 954 (1983).
[321 Companies Act (Comp. Act), 1985, §§ 428-430; see also Financial Services Bill (Bill
122), Parliament 1986, § 142 & Schedule 10.
[33] R. Pennington, Pennington's Company Law 806 (4th ed. 1979).
[34] Prevention of Fraud (Investments) Act, 1958, 6 & 7 Eliz. 2, ch. 45, § 14.
[35] A takeover offer is defined as an offer "calculated to result in any person acquiring or
becoming entitled to acquire control," i.e., "the exercise of a majority of the voting power." See
Licensed Dealers (Conduct of Business) Rules, Rule 18(1) (1960). This same body of rules imposes
the following additional requirements: that the offer be kept open for at least 21 days (Sched. 1,
Part 11, paras 1(1)(ii), 2(2)); that minimum conditions be stipulated where the offer is conditional
(Sched. 1, Part 11, para. 1(3)); that the offer not be conditional upon acceptors agreeing to
compensate directors for loss of office (Sched. 1, Part 11, paras 2(6), (7)); and that all shareholders
be treated alike on a partial bid (Sched. 1, Part 11, para. 1(4)).
[36] Securities Exchange Act of 1934, §§ 13(d)-(f), 14(d)-(f). 15 U.S.C. §§ 78m(d)-(f),
78n(d)-(f) (1982); Williams Act. Pub. L. No. 90-439, 82 Stat. 454 (1968) (codified as amended at
15 U.S.C. §§ 78m(d)-(e), 78n(d)-(f) (1982).
[37] Full Disclosure of Corporate Equity Ownership and Corporate Takeover Bids: Hearings on
S.520 Before the Sub-Comm. on Securities of the Senate Comm. on Banking and Currenc', 90th
Cong., 1st Sess. 2 (1967) [hereinafter cited as Senate Hearings].
[38] rd. at 17 (statement of SEC Chairman Manuel Cohen).
[39] Authors Note: The second of the reasons given by Mr. Cohen really involves two
aspects: i.e., equal treatment in the face of a takeover offer through the proration rule, and equal
opportunity by preventing acceptances being tied indefinitely. The above reasons - adequate
information, equal treatment, and equal opportunity - coupled with the requirement of adequate
time to enable information to be provided and decisions to be made, provide the cornerstones for
present day takeover legislation. This statement is equally applicable to U.S., U.K., and Australian
legislation.
[40] Company Law Advisory Committee, Second Interim Report to the Standing Committee
of Attorneys on Disclosure of Substantial Shareholdings and Takeover Bids (March 14, 1970)
(following the Report of the Eggleston Committee).
[41] The Companies (Acquisition of Shares) Act (CASA), 1981, Austl. Acts P. No. 2.
[42] The NCSC, composed of three full-time members, is directly responsible to and obliged
by law to obey the directors of the Ministerial Council, which consists of seven members: a
Ministerial representative of each of the six states and of the federal government. All powers
under companies and securities law are vested in the NCSC, which can delegate its power to the
State Corporate Affairs Commissions and direct those commissions in the exercise of their powers.
The States' (six) and Territories' (two) Corporate Affairs Commissions administer the lodging and
registration of incorporation documents, winding up, financial statements, and the day-to-day
aspects of companies and securities legislation. The division of responsibilities does not contem-
plate any form of separate federal and state corporation law as is the case in the U.S. See
Fleiseher, Federal Corporation Law: An Assessment, 78 Harv. L Rev. 1146 (1965).
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[43] See notes 25-51 and accompanying text.
[44] See Statement on Bid by Mooloya Investments for Customagic Manufacturing (July 9.
1978). cited in A. Johnstone, The City Takeover Code 125 (1980). Obtaining legal counsel's
opinion in lieu of such consultation is not regarded as an adequate substituteby the Panel. Id. at
4.
[45] Id. at 173-74.
[461 It costs £300,000 to administer the U.K. regulatory body as against £30,000,000 to
maintain the SEC. Id. at 176.
[471 There is, however, remarkable uniformity in Australian corporation law. The first
attempt at uniformity was the (Uniform) Companies Act, 1961, Austl. Acts P. No. 6839. This
scheme has been followed since. See Comp. Act, 1981, Austl. Acts P. No. 89: Securities Industry
Amendment Act, 1981, Austl. Acts P. No. 3; Securities Industry Amendment, 1981, Austl. Acts P.
No. 96; comp. (Acquisitions of Shares) Act, 1981, Austl. Acts P. No. 2. The laws are administered
by the appropriate state regulatory bodies.
[48] The exception concerned overseas companies violating the requirements of the Code.
This happened when De Beers Consolidated Mines of South Africa made a takeover bid for
Consolidated Gold Fields Ltd.. a U.K. company, in 1980. This case highlights the Panel's inability
to enforce its jurisdiction extraterritorially. See Report by a Special Committee of the Stock
Exchange on Dealings in Shares of Consolidated Gold Fields Ltd. 38 (July 1980).
[49] See Demott, supra note 31, at 955-56. The Panel can, of course, resort to such
draconian measures as depriving the offender of his licence to practice, delisting, or calling for the
appointment of inspectors under the Companies Act to investigate the affairs of the company. See
also City Code at Introduction.
[50] See, e.g., Ogden Indus. Pry Ltd. v. Lucas, 118 C.L.R. 32, 39 (P.C. 1968) (The court
states, "[I]t is quite clear that judicial statements as to the construction and intention of an act
must never be allowed to supplant or supersede its proper construction..."). But see Acts
Interpretation Act 1901-1973, 1984, § 15AB.
[51] CASA, 1981. Austl. Acts P. No. 2, § 6.
[521 Dawn raids are surreptitious acquisitions over a short period of time of a controlling or
influential block of shares in circumstances where the identity or change in percentage control is
unknown to the company or the other share holders.
[53] Warehousing is "the practice whereby a person or company (or a group of persons
and/or companies) accumulates, without public disclosure, a substantial block of shares in a
company with a view either to making a takeover bid or to selling the block to someone else who
then makes a bid." Quoted from the Panel in its answers to questions contained in Inquiry of the
Department of Trade (July 1974), cited in N. Weinberg & M. Blank, supra note 5, at 2373.
[54] See Report of the Company Law Committee, Cmd. 1749, para. 142 (1962):
[Djirectors, other shareholders, and indeed the employees of a company, all of
whom may be materially affected, ought to be able to ascertain the identity of any
substantial shareholder of the Company's share.... Even where a holder of a
substantial number of shares is not actually buying with ... [the intention of
control] ... it may be of interest to the others concerned to know whether, for
example, someone is in a position to veto a special resolution of the company, and
who that person is ....
[55) Securities Exchange Act of 1934, § 13(d), 15 U.S.C. § 78m (1982); Comp. Act, 1985, §
201.
[56] CASA, 1981, Austl. Acts P. No. 89, § 136.
[57] Comp. Act, 1985, § 198.
[58] See CASA, 1981, Austl. Acts. P. No. 89, §§ 134-146.
[59] Securities Exchange Act of 1934, § 13(d)(1), 15 U.S.C. § 78m(d)(1) (1982).
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[60] All three jurisdictions (City Code, Rule 8; CASA. Austi. Acts P. No. 89. §§ 134-146:
Securities Exchange Act of 1934, § 13(d)-1 15 U.S.C. § 78m(d)(1) (1982), 17 C.F.R. § 240.13(d) - 1
(1985). and Rule 13d-1) require disclosure of the name and address of the holder, nature of the
interest, and details of any arrangements connected with the acquisition of such interests. In the
U.S., disclosure is also required of the source and amount of the funds to be used and the name of
the lender. Where control of the offeree is sought, disclosure of the plans and proposal of the
offeror is required, especially if a liquidation, merger, or sale of assets of the offeree is
contemplated. 17 C.F.R. 240.13(d)-101 (1985) (Schedule 13D, Item 4(b)). The U.K. Companies
Act, 1985, § 324 requires registers showing all disclosed interests (including interests held by
directors) to be kept open for inspection by the public. Comp. Act, 1985, §324. There is a similar
requirement in Australia. but the requirement is not limited to listed companies. CASA, 1981,
Austl. Acts P. No. 89, § 143. Additionally, in the U.K., all companies are required to maintain a
register disclosing interests held by directors of the company. Comp. Act, 1985, § 325.
[61] 17 C.F.R. § 240.13(d)-i (1985).
[62] Id. § 240.13(d)-101 (Schedule 13D, General Instructions, Note C).
[63] Securities Exchange Act of 1934, § 13(d)-3, 15 U.S.C. § 78 m(d)(3) (1982).
[64] 453 F.2d 709 (2d Cir. 1971).
[65] Id. at 715.
[66] Id. at 718.
[67] This decision has been followed in SEC v. Savoy Indus., 587 F. 2d 1149 (D.C. Cir. 1978).
According to the Savoy court: (1) the requirement of an agreement to acquire additional shares
was unnecessary; (2) group activity under Section 13(d)(3) involved "a combination in support of
a common objective:" and (3) the existence of a group within the section could be demonstrated
circumstantially. Id. at 1162-63.
[68] CASA, 1981, Austl. Acts P. No. 2, § 7(4)-(6).
[69] The terms "beneficial owner" and "relevant interest" used in the U.S. and Australian
Acts, respectively, further assist in strengthening the applicability of the provisions.
[70] 453 F.2d 709 (2d Cir. 1971); see also supra notes 51-69 and accompanying text.
[71] 17 C.F.R. 240.13(d)-1(a) (1985).
[72] Sections 136-139 of the Australian Companies Code require the substantial shareholder
to notify the company of his holding and of any net changes of one percent in such holding
(upwards or downwards) or of his ceasing to be a substantial shareholder within two days of his
being obliged to do so. CASA, 1981, Austl. Acts P. No. 89, §§ 136-139.
[73] Comp. Act, 1985, § 202.
[74] Id § 212. This measure, as pointed out by Weinberg, enables the company to pursue an
inquiry: where it believes that a party might be acquiring a holding of less than five percent as a
preliminary step to mounting a bid; or where it believes that a party has accumulated a holding of
more than five percent and has not disclosed it: or where it is seeking to identify two parties who
might be cooperating together and accumulating holdings individually of less than five percent,
with a view in the future to mounting some form of bid. N. Weinberg & M. Blank, supra note 5,
at 573.
[75] Comp. Act, 1985, § 212. For this purpose, the provisions exempting certain interests
from being reported are excluded.
[76] Reasonable grounds and the manner in which the power is to be exercised have to be
given for the request. If the investigation into the company's share ownership is not completed
within three months, the company must make an interim report. Such interim reports must be
made for each successive three month period. The purpose is to prevent the company from
resorting to dilatory tactics. On completion of the investigations, a final report has to be made and
kept open for inspection. See id. § 215.
[77] City Code at Definitions.
[78] Unless exempted by the minimum acquisition of three percent over a six month period,
see CASA, 1981, Austl. Acts P. No. 2, § 15.
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[79] The SEC proposed a definition of "tender offer" in its Proposed Rule 14d-1(b)(1) of
May, 1979, which excludes privately negotiated acquisitions, whether on or off the exchange. SEC
Release No. 33-6159, Sec. Reg. & L. Rep. (BNA) No. 531, at F-1 (Dec. 5, 1979). A second
proposal was released in February. 1980. Exhibit B of the Memorandum of the SEC to the Senate
Comm., Sec. Reg. & L. Rep. (BNA) No. 542 (Special Supplement) at 5 (Feb. 27. 1980). Under the
second proposal. further acquisitions of stock by persons holding in excess of 10 percent must be
by way of "statutory offer" only, and acquisitions of stock of up to 10 percent by persons holding
in excess of five percent are subjected only to the reporting requirements under Section 13(d).
More recently, it has been proposed that no investor, other than an institutional investor, may
acquire more than five percent except pursuant to a formal tender offer for all of the targets
shares. Wirth Committee Report: Tender Reform Act 1984, H.R. Rep. No. 5693. The proposal,
sweeping as it is. does away with the need for a technical definition of tender offer except for
accumulations below the statutory threshold limit.
[80] The guidelines describe the characteristics of a tender offer:
1. Whether there is an 'active and widespread solicitation of public shareholders'
for shares of an issuer:
2. Whether the solicitation is made for a substantial percentage of the issuer's stock:
3. Whether the offer to purchase is made at a premium over the prevailing market
price;
4. Whether the terms of the offer are firm rather than negotiable:
5. Whether the offer is contingent on the tender of a fixed minimum number of
shares, and, perhaps, subject to the ceiling of a fixed maximum number to be
purchased;
6. Whether the offer is open for only a limited period of time;
7. whether the offerees are subjected to pressure to sell their stock. and
8. Whether public announcements of a purchasing program concerning the target
company precede or accompany a rapid accumulation of large amounts of target
company securities.
Wellman v. Dickinson, 475 F. Supp. 783. 823-24 (S.D.N.Y. 1979). aff'd on other grounds, 682 F.
2d 355 (2d Cir. 1982).
[811 See Cattlemen's Inv. Co. v. Fears. 343 F. Supp. 1248 (W.D. Okla. 1972) (the number of
solicitations made and the nature of such solicitations): Nachman Corp. v. Halfred Inc..
11973-1974 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) [ 94,455; D-Z Inv. Co. v. Holloway.
[1973-1974 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 1 94.588; Brascan Ltd. v. Edper Equities
Ltd., 477 F. Supp. 773 (S.D.N.Y. 1979) (Level of the solicitee's investment sophistication); Hoover
Co. v. Fuqua Indus., 11979-1980 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 1 97,107 (the nature of
the information provided); Wellman, 475 F. Supp. 783 (the time framework within which the
decisions have had to be made).
[82] Decisions with respect to open market acquisitions seem to indicate fairly clearly that
such purchases, if made without widespread public knowledge of the purchaser's intention, do not
constitute a tender offer. More recently, the SEC's eight-part guideline was turned against it by a
court which found that large-scale open market purchases did not fall within the Williams Act.
SEC v. Carter Hawley Hale Stores, Inc.. 760 F. 2d 945 (9th Cir. 1985).
(83] See supra note 81.
[84] See Wellman, 475 F. Supp. 783; Hoover Co., [1979-1980 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L.
Rep. (CCH) 97,107.
[85] Compare Brascan Ltd.. 477 F. Supp. 773 (doubting applicability of SEC'S eight factors)
witth Hoover Co., [1979-1980 Transfer BinderI Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 1 97,107 (SEC's eight
factors are convenient and highly relevant).
[861 City Code at Rule 25.1.
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[87] CASA, 1981, Austl. Acts P. No. 2, § 22(1)(a), (b).
[88] Id § 18(1). The phrase used is "not earlier than 21 days before that Part A statement is
served." The Part A statement and other relevant documents must be served on the offeree
company 14-28 days before the offers are dispatched. Id. § 16(1)(d). The offeror must, on the day
on which the Part A statement is served, lodge a copy of such statement with the Commission on
the Home Exchange Id. § 16(2)(c).
[89] 17 C.F.R. § 240.14(d)-3(a)(1).
[90] Id. § 240.14(e)-2(a) (1985).
[91] Id. § 240.14(d)-9.
[92] CASA, 1981, Austl. Acts P. No. 2, Schedule Part B Statement, Item 1(a); City Code, at
Rule 25; 17 C.F.R. § 240.14(d)-9, Schedule 14D-9, Item 4. The instructions to item 4 state:
"Conclusory statements such as 'the tender offer is in the best interests of shareholders' will not
be considered sufficient disclosure in response to Item 4(b)." 17 C.F.R. § 240.14(d)-101, Schedule
14D-9, item 4. The Australian Act contains major exclusions to the requirement that directors
disclose their position with respect to the offer. CASA, 1981, Austl. Acts P. No. 2, Schedule Part B
Statement, Item 1(a). There is also no obligation on target management to disclose the course of
action they intend to adopt with respect to their own holdings in the offeree company. Id; see also
City Code at Rule 25; 17 C.F.R. § 240.14(d)-100 (1985), Schedule 14D-1, Item 10(f); 17 C.F.R. §
240.14(d)-101 (1985), Schedule 14D-9, Item 8 (imposing additional general obligations on offeree
management).
[93] In Australia, this reporting is required of transactions conducted in the preceding three
months. CASA, 1981, Austl. Acts P. No. 2, Schedule Part A Statement, Item 7. In the U.K., the
most recent middle market quotation together with at least six other such quotations over the last
six months must be included. Licensed Dealers (Conduct of Business) Rules (1960), Schedule 1,
Part 1, para. 1(1).
[941 See 17 C.F.R. § 240.14(d)-100 (1985), Schedule 14D-1, Item 5. The Australian Act also
requires disclosure of any alterations in the capital structure of the offeror corporation during the
past five years. CASA, 1981, Austl. Acts P. No. 2, Part A, Item 1(e)(iii), (iv). In contrast, the U.K
Code contains a more searching provision: it requires disclosure of the long-term commercial
justification for the proposed offer. City Code at Rule 24.1(c).
[95] City Code at Rule 24.1(d). Neither the U.S. nor the Australian Act requires disclosure of
such plans.
[96] See City Code at Rule 28; CASA, 1981, Austl. Acts P. No. 2, § 37. CASA, Part A. Item
2 also requires disclosure of any restrictions on the right to transfer shares to which the offer
relates.
[97] City Code, at Introduction to the General Principles.
[98] See id. at Rule 3.1.
[99] Id. at General Principles No. 4 & Rule 2.
[100] Id. at Rule 6.
[101] 17 C.F.R. § 240.14(e)-1(a) (1985).
[102] Id.
[103] CASA, 1981, Austl. Acts P. No. 2, § 16(2)(f)(ii).
[104] Id. § 16(2)(a) (i.e., the offer must be to acquire all the shares of all shareholders in a
relevant class of shares or a proportion of the shares of all shareholders in a relevant class of
shares).
[1053 Id. § 16(2)(f)(vii)(A). In the case of a conditional offer, consideration is to be paid
within 30 days of the offer being accepted or becoming unconditional, whichever is later. Id. §
16(2)(f)(vii)(B).
[106] Securities Exchange Act of 1934, § 14(d)(1), 15 U.S.C. § 78n(d) (1982). The reason for
permitting advance registration with the NCSC under the Australian Act is to enable the NCSC to
ensure that incorrect offers are not being sent out and that the offers contain up-to-date
information. CASA, 1981, Austl. Acts P. No. 2, § 18(1).
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11071 CASA, 1981. Austl. Acts P. No. 2, § 18(1)(b).
[108] See supra notes 86-96 and accompanying text.
[1091 See supra notes 77-78 and accompanying text.
[1101 A "minimum price" is defined as the highest price paid by the on-market offeror or his
associates in the four months preceding the announcement. CASA, 1981, Austl. Acts P. No. 2. §
17(2).
[111] Robinson & Mahoney, Schedule 13D. Wild Card in the Takeover Deck, 27 Bus. Law.
1107, 1115 (1971). As to the origin of the special bid:
A "special offer" or "special bid" is a technique devised by the Exchanges in an
attempt to lure back some of the block trades lost to the third market. It permits the
buyer to offer an extra commission to the brokers who ind the other side of the
market, and it must remain open for a minimum of 15 minutes.
R. Jennings & H. Marsh, Securities Regulation, Cases and Materials 741 (4th ed. 1977).
[112] SEC Release No. 8392, [1969-1970 Decisions' Fed. See. L. Rep. CCH) 1 77.715 (Aug.
30, 1968).
[1131 The on-market offer, available only in Australia, is undesirable from the standpoint of
adequate time and equal treatment. CASA, 1981, Austl. Acts P. No. 2, § 17. An on-market offer
cannot be made by persons whose shareholdings exceed 30 percent so that possible collusion with
management is prevented. The offeror must provide certain required information and accept all
shares tendered. The offeror is not required to make available any subsequent increase in the
original offer to shareholders who have already accepted. In certain circumstances, an offer can be
withdrawn before the expiration of the one-month period. Shareholders, however, cannot withdraw.
Id. The resulting effect is to pressure shareholders.
[114] City Code at General Principle 1.
[1151 Johnstone. supra note 44. at 202.
(1161 City Code at Rule 16.
[1171 There are reasons for the Panel's disapproval of an offeror subsequently increasing the
consideration offered:
Even if the arrangement purports to be given to all shareholders, this cannot in fact
happen since there would be other vendors selling shares at the same time or later
without the benefit of the condition. Not only are these other vendors being treated
unfairly, but the removal of a block of shares on special terms could discourage a
potential competitive offeror who might make a better offer.
Johnstone, supra note 44, at 283.
1118] City Code at Rule 32.
[119] CASA, 1981, Austl. Acts P. No. 2, § 16(2)(b).
[120] Id. § 17(11).
[1211 Id. § 27.
[1221 Id. § 17(8).
[123] This would not, however, prevent the making of a two-tiered offer as evidenced by the
recent Mobil Corp. v. Marathon Oil Co., 669 F.2d 366, 367 (6th Cir. 1981), cert denied. 455 U.S.
982 (1982). In that case, U.S. Steel, having acquired 51% of Marathon Oil shares at $125 per share,
made a subsequent offer of $75 per share for the rest - approximately $3 above the then
prevailing market price. Mobil was unsuccessful in its own two-tiered offer.
It is possible to make a two-tier bid in Australia but not in the U.K. In the U.K. the bid must
be for all the shares unless the Panel permits a partial bid. The Panel could act to prevent a
subsequent lower bid for the rest of the shares. City Code at Rule 36.1.
[1241 493 A.2d 946 (Del. 1985).
[125) SEC Release No. 33-6595, 50 Fed. Reg. 27,976 (1985) (withdrawn 50 Fed. Reg. 27.981).
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[126] SEC Release No. 33-6596, 50 Fed. Reg. 28,210 (1985). The rule also provides that a
tender offer must remain open for 10 business days upon the announcement of an increase in the
amount of securities sought by the bidder. Id.
[1271 Id. Thus, the proposed amendments to Rule 13e-4 require: (1) an issuer tender offer to
remain open for a minimum period of 20 business days; (2) securities to be accepted on a pro rata
basis; (3) an initial minimum 15 business day period during which tendered securities can be
withdrawn and exercisable until the expiration of 10 business days following the date of
commencement by a third party tender offer, (4) issuer tender offers to remain open for a period
of 10 business days following the date of increase in the consideration offered, in the price paid to
dealers to solicit shareholders to tender, or in the number of shares sought. The requirements are
similar to those of third party tender offers under Rules 14e-1 (17 C.F.R. § 240. 14(e)(1) (1985)),
14d-7 (17 C.F.R. § 240.14(d)(7)), and 14e-I(b) (17 C.F.R. § 240.14(e)-1(b)). See SEC Release
No. 33-6596, supra note 125, at 28,210-11.
(128] 15 U.S.C. § 78n(d)(6) (1982).
[129] CASA, 1981, Austl. Acts P. No. 2, § 26.
[130] City Code at Rule 36. The Panel's consent will not normally be given if an offer for the
whole of the equity has already been announced (even if by a rival offeror) or if the applicant or
persons acting in concert with the applicant have acquired, in the previous 12 months, shares in
the offeree company selectively, as from controlling shareholders, or in significant amounts. Id. at
'Rule 36.2. Approval to acquire up to 30% is freely given, while approval to acquire more than 30%
but less than 50% is rarely given and, in any event, will not be given unless the board of the
offeree company recommends it.
[131] City Code at Rules 36.4-36.6. But see Financial Services Bill (Bill 122), Parliament
(1986), § 142 & Schedule 10 (requiring a takeover bid to be for all of target's shares or for all of a
particular class of target's shares).
[132] CASA, 1981, Austl. Acts P. No. 2, § 42(2).
[133] Comp. Act, 1985, §§ 428, 430; see also Financial Services Bill, § 142 & Schedule 10.
[134] The acquisition is also required when the shares available for acquisition are less than
90% of the total shares outstanding and at least 75% of the offerees tender at least 90% of tle
available outstanding stock. See Comp. Act, 1985, §§ 429-430; CASA, 1981, Austl. Acts P. No. 2,
§ 42(1), (2); see also Financial Services Bill, § 142 & Schedule 10.
[135] CASA, 1981, Austl. Acts P. No. 2, § 42(2), (8); Comp. Act, 1985. §§ 428-430: see also
Financial Services Bill, § 142 & Schedule 10.
[136] City Code at Rule 31.1.
[1371 Id. at Rule 34. An offer is not capable of being declared unconditional after 3:30 p.m.
on the sixtieth day after the day on which the offer was initially posted unless it has previously
been declared unconditional. Id. at Rule 31.6.
[138] The offeror can extend the offer for a further 21 days. Id. at Rules 31.1-31.2.
[1391 17 C.F.R. § 240.14(d)-7(a)(1) (1985).
[140] I'd. at § 240.14(d)-7(a)(2). The Australian Act does not provide for withdrawal by the
shareholder. This is particularly unfair to the acceptor since offers under a takeover scheme can be
left open for a period of one to six months.
[141] Johnstone, supra note 44, at 244-47; see also hifra notes 171-79 and accompanying text
(Section 5 - problem of partial bids).
[142] CASA, 1981, Austl. Acts P. No. 2, § 21.
[143] City Code at Rule 9.1(b).
[144] CASA, 1981, Austl. Acts P. No. 2, § 15.
[145] 15 U.S.C. § 78n(d)(8) (1982).
[146] Id. at Rules 6.2, 7.1, 11.1, 32.3; CASA, 1981, Austl. Acts P. No. 2. §§ 17(8), 31.
[147] See, e.g., City Code at Rules 6, 7 (an offeror may generally not purchase on the
Exchange after the forthy-sixth day, as no revision is permitted after that time except for a single
https://scholarship.law.upenn.edu/jil/vol8/iss3/3
R. Sappideen / Takeover bids and target shareholder protection
purchase which takes the offeror over the 50% level): CASA, 1981, Austl. Acts P. No. 2. § 17(9)
(purchase at a price higher than that specified in a takeover announcement cannot be made during
the last five trading days of the acquisition program).
[1481 CASA, 1981, Austl. Acts P. No. 2, §§ 13(5), 45(1). 46. Under the City Code, once an
offer is made it cannot be withdrawn. City Code at Rule 31.1.
1149] CASA, 1981, Austl. Acts P. No. 2. § 39(2). City Code at Rule 8.1.
1150] CASA. 1981, Austl. Acts P. No. 2. § 39(4); cf. Comp. Act, 1985. § 198.
[1511 CASA. 1981. Austl. Acts P. No. 2. § 35.
[152] See supra note 145 and accompanying text.
[1531 17 C.F.R. § 240.10(b)-13 (1985). The purpose of the prohibition is to protect public
investors who, if the tender offer was prorated, might have lost the opportunity to tender all their
shares, whereas those whose shares were purchased outside the tender offer would not be
prorated. See SEC Release No. 34-9395. 36 Fed. Reg. 23,359 (1971) (proposed Nov. 24. 1971)
(interpretation of Rule 10b-13-Payment of Solicitation Fees in Tender Offers), reprinted in [1973]
Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 22,763.
[154] 17 C.F.R. 240.10b-13 (1985).
(1551 15 U.S.C. §§ 78m(d)-(e), 78n(d)-(f) (1982).
1156] 356 F. Supp. 1066 (S.D.N.Y.). aff'd. 476 F.2d 687 (2d Cir. 1973).
1157] Id. at 1074.
[1581 308 U.S. 66 (1939). See also infra note 174 (the problem of the prisoner's dilemma).
[159] See SEC Release No. 33-6595. supra note 125.
(160) Rubin, Arbitrage. 32 Bus. Law. 1315. 1317 (1977).
[161] In addition to the price differential, arbitrageurs also receive a solicitation fee equivalent
to a double commission. See Hayes & Taussig. Tactics of Cash Takeover Bids - For Bidders.
Incumbent Managements and Shareholders. in Senate Hearings, snpra note 37. at 229. According
to SEC Release No. 34-9395. the "anticipation of receipt of the soliciting dealer's fee may induce
the arbitrageur to purchase the stock to be tendered at prices up to. and possibly even in excess of.
the tender price." SEC Release No. 34-9395. supra note 153.
1162] Rubin. supra note 160, at 1317.
1163] According to the efficient market theory, stock prices fully reflect all available informa-
tion on a given security at a particular moment of time. See Fama. Efficiem Capital Markets: A
Review of Theoi , and Empirical Work. 25 J. Fin. 383 (1970). The security's price adjusts to
available information on a random basis. See Fama. Random Walks in Stock Market Prices, 21
Fin. Analysts J. 55 (1965).
(1641 It would appear that the higher threshold levels in the U.K. and Australia would favor
greater arbitraging activities in these two countries. The converse, however, is true. In the U.K.
and Australia, the offeror. upon reaching the minimum threshold level, can acquire further shares
only by way of a tender offer. By contrast, in the U.S.. the privately negotiated exemption to the
definition of tender offer enables the offeror to acquire unlimited shares from arbitrageurs.
Risk-arbitrage is less developed in Australia. Institutional investors, as a rule, sell directly to the
offeror through their brokers. This has not prevented tender offers from being highly contested
events as considerable purchases are made by rival offerors and third parties seeking to obtain
strategic holdings in the target company. See Henry, Activities of Arbitrageurs in Tender Offers.
119 U. Pa. L. Rev. 466 (1971).
In the U.S., the arbitrageur's strategy is to obtain, as cheaply as possible in the market place.
an amount close to five percent and to make further acquisitions thereafter by private negotiation.
Care must be taken to prevent any ties between the initial acquisitions of up to five percent and
the negotiated acquisitions thereafter. Wellman, 475 F. Supp. at 828-31.
[165] See snpra notes 78-85 and accompanying text.
1166] It could be argued that arbitraging will continue to flourish because arbitrageurs will
take into account the increased uncertainty and discount their purchase price accordingly.
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[167] See supra notes 52-76 and accompanying text.
[168] Pratte, Risk Arbitrage, 1971 Bulletin of the N.Y.U. Grad. Seh. of Bus. Ad. Inst. of Fin.
[169] The arbitrageur has no loyalty to either the offeror or the target, regardless of which
securities the arbitrageur is eventually selling. See supra notes 160-61 and accompanying text.
[170 See Comment, Should Tender Offer Arbitrage Be Required?, Duke LJ. 1000 (1978).
[171] See supra notes 78-85 and accompanying text.
[172] City Code, at Rule 36.6. Partial bids seeking statutory control must be conditional upon
acceptances of over 50% of the voting rights attributable to such equity shares and be approved by
over 50% of the holders of total voting rights (including non-equity shares) in the target. Id.; see
also N. Weinberg & M. Blank, supra note 5, at 988. Panel consent is obtainable without difficulty
for acquisitions under 30% as the control wielded from such a holding is precarious. Consent for
acquisitions between 30% and 50%, however, is given sparingly. City Code at Rule 36. The Panel
feels acquirers of control should assume certain special obligations. See Report by the Special
Comm. of the Stock Exch. On Dealing in the Shares of Consolidated Gold Fields Ltd. 49 (July
1980) [hereinafter cited as Consolidated Gold Fields Ltd. Report ].
[173] See Companies and Securities Law Review Committee, Discussion Paper No. 2, Partial
Takeover Bids, para. 12 (Sydney, March, 1985) [hereinafter cited as Discussion Paper].
[174] The "prisoner's dilemma" represents a situation where an inability to coordinate
decisions leads to less than optimal results for the persons affected. See Samuelson, Economies
506-07 (1976). To illustrate, assume target shares currently selling at $30 per share are held by A
and B (50 each). A two-tiered offer has been received: $40 per share for half the outstanding stock
and a second round take out merger (forced acquisition) of $30 for the remaining shares. Assume
also that if the offer fails, the price will stabilize at $37 per share. The inherent dilemma is that
maximum gains flow to A and B only if they can adopt a common strategy, in this ease reject the
offer. According to the example, outright rejection will send the value of shares owned by A or B
up to $1850 ($37 X 50). Failure to adopt a common strategy means that A will have to live with the
fear that B will tender at $40 per share (and vice versa). If A does not tender but B does, B will
receive $2000 (S40X50) while A will receive $1500 ($30Xc50). If both tender, they will each
receive $1000 ($40X25) plus $750 ($30 X25) for a total of $1750. See Carney, Shareholder
Coordination Costs, Shark Repellents and Takeout Mergers: The Case Against Fiduciarr Duties,
1983 Am. B. Foundation Research J. 341, 350-51.
[175] The other shareholders will gladly make up for the percentage not tendered by the
rejecting shareholder.
[176] See Excerpts from Final Report of SEC Advisory Committee on Tender Offers, 15 Sec.
Reg. & L. Rep. (BNA) No. 28, at 1375, 1376 (July 15, 1983) (Recommendation 16).
[177] See Discussion Paper, supra note 173, at para. 48.
[178] Thus, under CASA partial bids must bid proportionately for each shareholder's holding
rather than for a proportion of the total shares in the company. CASA, 1981, Austl. Acts P. No. 2,
§ 16(2)(a). Also, CASA prohibits offers subject to maximum acceptance conditions. The intention
is to prohibit selective share acquisitions by judicious use pro rata and first come, first served bids.
CASA, 1981, Austl. Acts P. No. 2, §§ 16(2)(h),G).
[179] See Dennis, Two-Tiered Tender Offers and Greenmail: Is New Legislation Needed?, 19
Ga. L. Rev. 281, 281-82 (1985).
[180] See City Code at General Principles 7, 9 & Rule 21. These provisions prohibit target
management actions which are intended to or would thwart a prospective tender offer unless
consent of target shareholders has been obtained.
[181] See, e.g., Panter v. Marshall Field & Co., 646 F.2d 271, 288 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 454
U.S. 1092 (1981). "Management has the responsibility to oppose offers which, in its best
judgment, are detrimental to the company or its stockholders." Id., citing Northwest Indus. v.
B.F. Goodrich Co., 301 F. Supp. 706, 712 (N.D. I1. 1969); see also Lowenstein, Prunting
Deadwood in Hostile Takeovers, 83 Colum. L. Rev. 249 (1983).
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[182] The rule presumes that the directors of a corporation, in making a business decision.
acted on an informed basis, in good faith and in the honest belief that the action taken was in the
best interests of the company. Zapata Corp. v. Maldonado, 430 A.2d 779 (Del. 1981). The rule
evolved as a corollary to the principle that a board of directors stands in a fiduciary relationship
to the shareholders it represents. Because the role of a fiduciary ordinarily does not admit of any
conflicting interests or conduct, the Business Judgment Rule seeks to accommodate that status to
the realities of the business world. Moran v. Household Int'l Inc., 490 A.2d 1059. 1074 (Del. Ch.).
aff 'd, 500 A.2d 1346 (Del. Super. Ct. 1985).
The rule recognizes the corporation as a risk taker and management as providing the necessary
leadership. The rule seeks, in this context, to relieve directors from liability for honest decisions
made in the course of carrying out their functions. The benefit of the rule is not available in
situations of fraud or bad faith, or if the decision has been based on inadequate information. Mere
evidence of benefits to management flowing from tender offer defensive tactics is not suggestive of
bad faith or improper conduct. See Panter. 646 F.2d at 295. The courts view each situation in the
light of its own facts. Generally, it is safer to take defensive measures in advance of rather than in
the face of an offer. Also, any excessive management response may prove indefensible. The
difficulty is in delineating the threshold point.
[1831 See Comment, Corporate Takeover Battles, 27 How. L.J. 1683 (1984).
1184] For a recent example see the self-tender by General American Oil against the tender
offer bid by Mesa. The acquisition was to be financed by a loan. Shares in General American were
eventually acquired by a white knight, Phillips Petroleum Co., for a higher price. Another
self-tender offer by Pogo Producing Co., financed by the issue of convertible preferred stock to a
friendly third party, was able to defeat a hostile bid by Northwest Industries Inc. and Sedco Inc.
Houston Natural Gas Corp. combined a self tender offer with a counter tender offer for Coastal
Corp. The matter was ultimately resolved by greenmailing Coastal Corp. See generally Lipton &
Vlahakis, Takeover Responses - 1984 DevelopmPnts. 2 U.C. San Diego Sec. Reg. Inst. 21, 22
(1984).
[185] A recent example is Carter Hawley Hale Stores' response to the bid by The Limited.
Carter Hawley (a) sold 1,000,000 shares of convertible preferred stock to General Cinema Corp.
for S300 million, (b) granted General Cinema a six month option to buy its Walden Books
operation for approximately $285 million, and (c) allocated up to $500 million for a share
repurchase program in the open market and in privately negotiated transactions. See Lipton &
Vlahakis, supra note 184, at 22-23.
[186] Two differences with respect to self-tender offers and ordinary share repurchases should
be noted: (1) self-tenders are open to all target shareholders (though subject to the percentage
prescribed) while share repurchases tend to be selective: (2) self-tenders are governed by Rule
13e-4. 17 C.F.R. § 240.13(e)-4 (1985). There is no such provision governing ordinary share
repurchases.
[1871 For an excellent analysis of the subject, see Lowenstein, Management Buyouts. 85
Colum. L. Rev. 730 (1985).
1188] The U.S. legislature's concern for fairness on this matter is evidenced in recent proposals
seeking uniformity in the requirements governing self-tender offers and third party offers. The
existing requirements favor issuer self-tenders as against third party tenders and at the expense of
target shareholders. The proposed uniformity will benefit target shareholders. See supra notes
126-27 and accompanying text.
[189] Various U.S. jurisdictions have applied the Business Judgment Rule to the takeover
defense strategies of management, including the sale of "crown jewels." Moran, 500 A.2d at 1350;
see also supra note 123 and accompanying text.
[190] 535 F. Supp. 933, 951 (N.D. Il1. 1982) (Brunswick agreed to sell its Sherwood Medical
Division to American Home Products as a defensive measure).
[191] Id. at 949.
[192] See Wall St. J., Apr. 23, 1980. at 10, col. 1; Wall St. J.. June 18, 1980, at 21. col. 2.
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[1931 See Wall St. J., May 15, 1980, at 6, col. 1.
[194] See Acquisitions and Mergers: Tactics and Techniques 1983, Practising Law Institute 115
(No. 419); see also, e.g., Martin Marietta Corp. v. Bendix Corp. 549 F. Supp. 623, 625 (D. Md.
1982) ("Bendix and Marietta have engaged in a fierce PAC-MAN ... struggle.").
[1951 549 F. Supp. 623 (D. Md. 1982).
[196] 551 F. Supp. 639 (D. Del. 1982), aff'd, 769 F.2d 152 (3d Cir. 1985).
[197] See The Pac Man Defense: Developments in Directors' Responsibilities and Tactical
Observations 1983, Practising Law Institute; see also, e.g.. Jacobs, 551 F. Supp. at 641-42.
[198] See, e.g., Jones v. H.F. Ahmanson & Co., 1 Cal. 3d 93. 460 P.2d 464, 81 Cal. Rptr. 592
(1969).
[199] ASARCO Inc. v. Court, 611 F. Supp. 468 (D.NJ. 1985).
[200] See Note, Protecting Shareholders Against Partial and Two-Tiered Takeovers: The
"Poison Pill" Preferred, 97 Harv. L. Rev. 1964 (1984).
[201] See Gilson, The Case Against Shark Repellent Amendments: Structural Limitations on the
Enabling Concept, 34 Stan. L. Rev. 775, 790-91 (1982).
[202] Share repurchases are prohibited in Australia. CASA, 1981, Austl. Acts P. No. 89. § 129.
The U.K. permits share purchases off market if approved by special resolution, and on market (on
the Stock Exchange) if approved by the company at a general meeting. Comp. Act, 1985, §§ 164,
166.
[203] See G. Jarrell & M. Ryngaert, The Impact of Targeted Share Rcpurchaes (Greenmail)
on Stock Prices (1984); Macey & McChesney, A Theoretical Analt'sis of Corporate Greeninail, 95
Yale L.J. 13, 14-15 (1985). Recently, in Heckmann v. Ahmanson & Steinberg, 168 Cal. App. 3d
199, 214 Cal. Rptr. 1 (1985), the California Court of Appeal upheld the granting of an injunction
by the lower court against greenmailing. In addition, the recipient of greenmail was held
accountable as a constructive trustee. It must be noted, however, that the court found the directors
of the target in this particular case not to have satisfied the Business Judgment Rule. Id.
[204] CASA, 1981, Austl. Acts P. No. 2, § 50. Golden parachutes are favorable employment
contracts with individual members of target management. In the event of an unfriendly takeover,
target management would receive substantial severance bonuses.
[205] CASA, 1981, Austl. Acts P. No. 89, § 129.
[206] Associated Australian Stock Exchanges (AASE) Listing Requirement 3K(1).
1207] CASA, 1981, Austl. Acts P. No. 2, § 14.
[208] Id. § 12(g); see also AASE Listing Requirement 3R(3).
[209] AASE Listing Requirement 3S(1) states: "Any sale or disposal of the company's main
undertaking shall be conditional upon ratification by shareholders in general meeting" (emphasis
added).
[210] Comp. Act, 1981, Austl. Acts P. No. 890, § 76(2), authorizes Charter amendments that
take effect on the occurrence of a later event, while section 76(3) reads:
Without limiting the generality of sub-section (2), the further requirement referred
to in that sub-section may be a requirement -
(a) that the relevant special resolution be passed by a majority consisting of a
greater number of members than is required to constitute the resolution as a
special resolution;
(b) that the consent or approval of a particular person be obtained- or
(c) that a particular condition be fulfilled.
Id. § 76(3). Companies are allowed to include shareholder plebiscite provisions in their constituent
documents. Such provisions, however, cease to have effect after three years or such lesser time as
the constituent documents provide. CASA, 1981, Austl. Acts P. No. 2, § 31A,31B.
[211] See Parliament of the Commonwealth of Australia. House of Representatives, Compa-
nies (Acquisition of Shares) Bill 1980, Explanatory Memorandum CI. 71, Policy Release No. 101,
Issue I (July 1, 1981) (policy statement by the Australian NCSC).
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12121 See Comp. Act, 1985: Prevention of Fraud (Investments) Act, 1958, 6 & 7 Eliz. 2. ch. 45.
[213] See Edgar v. MITE Corp., 457 U.S. 624 (1982) (state law inconsistent with federal
regulation on tender offers declared unconstitutional).
[214] In Australia, there exists uniform interstate legislation. See supra notes 42 & 47.
[2151 See Australian Financial System, Final Report of the Committee of Inquiry, para. 21.11.
at 365-66 (1981).
[216] See. e.g., Re St. Piran Ltd., [1981] 3 All E.R. 270; Consolidated Gold Fields Ltd.
Report, supra note 172.
1217] Benston, The Costs and Benefits of Go'ernment-Required Disclosure in Corporations at
the Crossroads 37 (D.A. de Mott ed. 1980). Contra Fiflis, Economic Analysts as One Phase of
Utihitartantz. in id. at 70.
[218] For example, the SEC's continued acceptance of historical cost; its failure to develop
accounting standards: and its failure to develop other needed guidelines, such as the definition of
tender offer."
[219] See H. Kripke, The SEC and Corporate Disclosure; Regulation in Search of a Purpose
(1979). Because the SEC is dominated "by lawyers to the exclusion of economic thinkers", it
.. shows a tendency to treat disclosure as a moral issue" rather than a pragmatic one. Id. at 18. For
this reason, Kripke notes, there has been a marked tendency for the SEC to adopt voluminous and
detailed regulations with little regard for their impact upon the regulated. The SEC has also
overstretched its actual powers and is obsessed with punishment. He questions whether the
elaborate mandatory disclosure requirements continue to be necessary in the face of natural forces
within the capital markets (which protect sophisticated investors) and the efficient markets theory
(which protect unsophisticated investors). Id.
12201 See R. Karmel, Regulation by Prosecution (1982).
[221] See, e.g., Fiflis, supra note 217.
1222] Financial Services Bill (Bill 122). Parliament (1986); see also Financial Services in the
United Kingdom: A New Framework for Investor Protection. Cmd. 9432. at 13 (1985).
[223] See Scaly, The Financial Sen,ces Bill. 7 The Company Law. 59 (1986).
[2241 Id.
[225] See Financial Services Bill, § 96. Initially. however, all power is to be vested in the
Secretary of State who, if satisfied that certain conditions are met, may transfer such powers to the
Agency with Parliamentary approval. Id.
[226] To give meaning to this framework, the Bill repeals the Prevention of Fraud (Invest-
ments) Act, 1958; Administration of Justice Act, 1965 (Schedule 1); and Companies Act, 1985 (§§
81-83 & 86, giving effect to the Prevention of Fraud (Investments) Act. 1958). See Financial
Services Bill, at Schedule 13.
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